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WHY CHOOSE LTAS? AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF OHIO MANUFACTURERS’
CONTRACTUAL CHOICES THROUGH A
BARGAINING LENS
JULIET P. KOSTRITSKY*
JESSICA ICE**
This Article contributes to recent scholarship regarding Long Term
Agreements (“LTAs”) by providing empirical evidence that suppliers are
more likely to undertake the costs of an LTA if the transaction requires
significant capital expenditures or the potential for large sunk costs.
Through a survey of a random group of sixty-three Ohio manufacturers,
the Article explores why manufacturers with a full range of contractual
and non-contractual solutions might choose one set of arrangements
over others.1 It then seeks to link its findings to a broader theory of how
parties bargain to solve durable problems under conditions of
uncertainty, sunk costs, and opportunism, while minimizing costs.
Although only a small portion (seventeen percent) of our sample size
indicated that they used LTAs in the majority of their transactions, this
group indicated they were more likely to produce customizable goods
and have significant capital expenditures. Such a finding is consistent
with a model of bargaining in which parties in a transaction seek to
achieve their overall goals of wealth maximization while minimizing
costs under conditions that include bounded rationality, sunk costs, and
* Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Contract Law and Center for Business

Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. She would like to thank William
Whitford and Stewart Macaulay and Lisa Bernstein for encouraging this project of
empirical research. Thanks are also due to Professors Ronald J. Coffey, Peter Gerhart,
Brian Gran, Susan Helper, David Porter, Liza Vertinsky, and the interviewees. Alexa
Shook, Jillian Fox, and Stephen J. Kovacic provided excellent research assistance.
Timerra Jung provided the administrative help needed for the survey of Ohio
manufacturers. Oliver E. Williamson’s work remains central to this work.
** J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law; M.A., University of Zurich;
B.A., Jacobs University Bremen.
1. Based on the comments provided by respondents, most survey participants
seemed to be suppliers to buyers.
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opportunism. If a product is customized for a particular buyer, and the
supplier invests sunk costs toward customization, that investment makes
it difficult and costly to exit the relationship or resell to others. Where
such vulnerabilities exist, the need for protection may justify the costs of
LTAs. The non-adoption of LTAs by some suppliers demonstrates that
the new organizational form of networked firms, governed by an LTA and
straddling markets and hierarchies, has not captured all of
manufacturing and reflects a diversity of arrangement.2 The nonadoption of LTAs may be one way suppliers respond to the stresses and
frictions of the new architecture of supplier relations. Those stresses
show that the new organizational paradigm is not static and suffers from
the same hazards as an exchange relation. The willingness of suppliers
to adopt an LTA when facing large sunk costs shows the continuing
importance of sunk costs in institutional decision making and offers an
additional reason beyond the need to collaborate under conditions of
uncertainty to explain why parties adopt LTAs.3 The other type of risks
— opportunism and vulnerability from investing large resources — may
be best handled by entering into an LTA because it offers security,
including implicit protections needed for the supplier to invest. The
switching costs that lock parties into a mutual dependency and protect
parties who have invested comes gradually, but without the LTA, the
supplier would be reluctant to undertake the initial investment.
The importance of sunk costs may also explain the choice of buyers
to operate under an LTA. Since many of the benefits of LTAs, including
information sharing, could be achieved by buyers hierarchically and
imposed on suppliers, the explanation for adopting LTAs may lie with the
need to collaborate under conditions of uncertainty and the benefits in
terms of added value derived from “managerial contracting” practices,4
2. See Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in Routines, in THE FIRM AS A
COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
107 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006) [hereinafter Sabel, Real-Time
Revolution] (discussing an “organizational revolution” distinct from the Chandlerian
revolution of vertically integrated bureaucratic firms). The new ways of organizing
follow from new ways of producing goods. JOSH WHITFORD, THE NEW OLD ECONOMY:
NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MANUFACTURING 16–17 (2005) (discussing the “new production paradigm”). There are
other ways that supplier firms might respond to the stresses in the supply chain other than
by opting out of an LTA. They might decide to refuse to engage in joint design with an
Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) and instead furnish that OEM only with
older technology that is already patented. That protects the supplier against the OEM
licensing a supplier’s intellectual property to others. The strategy might be described as
“patent the heck out of it” before working with an OEM. See also Interview with
[Redacted], in [Redacted]. (Aug. 8, 2018) (confidential source on file with author).
3. Sunk costs may also play a role in the willingness of large buyers, such as OEMs,
to adopt LTAs.
4. Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting: A Preliminary Study
1 (May 18, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (defining “managerial
provisions” and discussing the significance of such terms to contracting relationships and
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but with the need to protect large investments through the security offered
by an LTA. Thus, there are two functions of LTAs: (1) how-to provisions
to guide and improve production; and (2) provisions offering security of
a continuing commitment either through express provisions or implicit
protections. This Article suggests that although information-sharing
protocols serve to “institutionalize learning,”5 help parties when there
is an “inability” to know how to solve a production problem, and offer
more information to informally enforce new types of behavior that are
non-compliant, these benefits might occur by means other than an LTA.
For example, a quality manual may impose a quality assessment be done
by the buyer at the supplier’s plant. Alternate means of obtaining the
information outside of an LTA raise the question of why LTAs are
adopted.

I. Introduction ...................................................................................340
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III. Sourcing and Contractual Choices in the Age of Deverticalization: An Evolving Landscape...............................345
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A. Cost Minimization and Opportunism................................370
B. Non-Contractual Cost Minimization Alternatives ............371
C. LTAs as a Cost Minimization Strategy .............................373
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productivity).
5. Matthew C. Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract Design, 14
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83, 88 (2008) [hereinafter Jennejohn, Collaboration]; see also
Susan Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While
Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 443, 468 (2000) (observing that
collaborative firms inherently develop routines for evaluating and improving current
processes).
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G. Informal and Implicit Contracts........................................385
X. Conclusion ...................................................................................387
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent scholarship identified modern Long Term Agreements (“LTAs”),6
including information-sharing protocols, as “novel” governance structures
for innovative and collaborative ventures.7 Such scholarship hypothesized
that LTAs’ information-sharing provisions facilitate informal enforcement
and help “endogenize” trust in heterogeneous relationships in the innovation
sphere where none previously existed.8 Other scholarship focused on how
contract provisions “institutionalize learning,” thereby “fostering
innovation”9 and “establish[ing] processes of interorganizational
cooperation.”10 These functions are broadly useful for buyers. Professor
Bernstein says that they are “designed to keep the law . . . out.”11 But the
LTA fulfills a variety of functions including giving the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (“OEM”) the option to buy combined with some legal
protections such as unilateral termination rights, warranty, and IP
protections. How buyers structure these hybrid arrangements depends on
how the arrangement of provisions and informal enforcement, facilitated by
the information-sharing function, operate to achieve the buyers’ varied goals,
including maximizing profits. Many of the agreements studied by scholars,
such as the OEM agreement, are drafted by the buyer.12
In order to answer the comparative question of why suppliers choose an
6. These agreements are sometimes referred to as Master Supply Agreements or
MSAs.
7. Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 5, at 83.
8. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1404 (2010)
[hereinafter Gilson et al., Braiding] (“[Parties] write contracts in which they manifestly
intend to establish a deeply collaborative relation, where little or none existed before,
through a combination of formal and informal elements.”).
9. Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 5, at 88–89.
10. John P. Esser, Institutionalizing Industry: The Changing Forms of Contract, 21
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 593, 625 (1996).
11. Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 562 (2015)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts]. But many provisions in LTAs deal
with warranties and indemnities, provisions that are relevant only when there is resort to
legal remedies. Thus, the effort to “keep the law” out remains partial.
12. Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto
Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 954, 957 (2006).
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LTA in only some cases, the research team for this Article decided that
instead of studying existing LTAs and hypothesizing what functions they
could serve, it would survey a random group of Ohio manufacturers to see
what kind of arrangements they used to govern their transactions. Through
such a survey, together with qualitative interviews of firms,13 the research
team hoped to learn why, with a full range of contractual and non-contractual
solutions, suppliers might choose one set of arrangements over another.
Empirical data gathered in this way might support the idea that parties choose
their arrangements in a discriminating way to control contractual hazards
while minimizing costs.14
This Article first outlines the current view of LTAs within innovation
scholarship and provides an overview of contractual and organizational
choices under the increased de-verticalization of firms. The Article then
outlines the current gap in the literature related to understanding LTA usage
from the supplier’s perspective. To address this gap, the Article outlines its
empirical analysis of supplier perspectives through a survey of Ohio
manufacturers. Finally, the Article links its findings to a broader theory of
how parties bargain to solve durable problems under conditions of
uncertainty, sunk costs, and opportunism, while minimizing costs.15
Ultimately our research suggests that the choices that parties make about
whether to enter into an LTA or not are driven by the same kinds of factors
that affect whether parties use modularity, “learning by monitoring,” or
13. Our research did not specifically study other arrangements beyond the choice of
using an LTA or not using one. There are other non-contractual choices (corporate ones).
A buyer could decide not to buy externally from a separate firm but rather to organize
the supplier into a separate subsidiary. The buyer might be particularly likely to choose
that corporate arrangement if the part needed presented a high risk for the buyer if the
part malfunctioned. By cabining the parts supplier into a separate subsidiary, the parent
could oversee the operation but could also secure a large insurance policy to cover any
risk if the part malfunctioned. The parent would be careful not to exercise control, but
only oversight, in order to avoid veil piercing. If the company can organize in that
manner and get an insurance policy to cover the risk, there may be no need for an LTA.
Because these decisions are made internally, and companies weigh the risks without an
LTA against the protection offered by an LTA, it might be hard to study the decision
making. However, the same process of cost minimization to control durable problems is
at play. In some instances, the choice results in a subsidiary furnishing a part rather than
the company securing an external supplier via an LTA.
14. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 114 (1996)
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS]. The drive to control contractual hazards —
when sunk costs exist — in a cost-minimizing way was identified by Oliver Williamson
as a crucial factor leading to the fundamental transformation of exchange relationships.
That drive helps to explain the governance choices parties make, including whether to
vertically integrate and how to structure buy transactions with external firms.
15. See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, A Bargaining Dynamic Transaction Cost
Approach to Understanding Framework Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1621 (2019)
(discussing durable problems explaining variety of supply chain arrangements).
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hedging. The contractual choice will affect the economics of the exchange
and the same lens should be used to analyze all of these choices. How to
achieve the parties’ goals at the least cost, while minimizing contractual
hazards, including opportunism,16 will drive all of these choices. This
Article sees LTAs as serving both to streamline production and to constrain
opportunism by cementing relationships, offering specific protection in an
option to buy at a fixed price, or through implicit protections that arise from
LTAs in the form of switching costs.17 Goals such as routinizing production
and preventing mistakes can be achieved through “managerial contracting”
provisions such as scorecards. However, those provisions could be imposed
unilaterally through quality control manuals imposed by buyers on all
suppliers or by an LTA.
II. LTAS WITHIN THE INNOVATION SCHOLARSHIP FRAMEWORK
Innovation scholars18 explain LTAs as a rational contractual response to
situations where it is difficult to reach a completely contingent contract to
control production because of high uncertainty over the final product and the
need to gain specialized knowledge held by external firms.19 LTAs differ
from the traditional contractual focus and contain many provisions that are
not geared toward establishing a basis for a breach.20 Instead, firms use such
“managerial provisions” to provide detailed processes for production that
can prevent mistakes and increase quality.21
This Article will first examine why many specific provisions exist in LTAs
16. See Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39) (explaining new
agreements as reflecting a move away from “documents that focused primarily on the
prevention of opportunism . . . to documents that devoted considerable attention to
governing the contractual relationship . . . .”).
17. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 8, at 1383 (discussing “managerial”
provisions as a way to control opportunism by suppliers). However, these provisions
also have the potential to introduce opportunism by allowing buyers to take information
from suppliers to get a lower price.
18. See, e.g., id. (describing “contract for innovation”); Jennejohn, Collaboration,
supra note 5, at 87 (detailing innovative contract mechanisms and methods).
19. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 8, at 1382 (discussing confluence of
uncertainty and need for expertise from external firms); see also Kostritsky, supra note
15, at 1631–32. If the product is certain in the innovation context, other uncertainties,
such as uncertainty about a counterparty’s behavior and his or her potential for
opportunism, remain uncertain throughout all supply chain transactions. What other
factors explain why the LTA prevails in some transactions but not others? This Article
will offer an explanation based on sunk costs.
20. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 562.
21. See Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3–5) (explaining that
“managerial provisions” are enforced not through courts but through non-traditional
mechanisms, such as “the threat of termination, the imposition of nonlegal sanctions, like
reputational harm or reduced order size, or in some relationships, the buyer’s right to
withhold part of the price . . . when delivery is late or quality is below specifications”).
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and describe the benefits of successful production. It will later examine
whether there are alternative ways of organizing production to achieve
similar benefits and examine how the need to protect sunk costs explains
why parties, such as suppliers, enter into LTAs. It will also suggest that the
drive to control opportunism and shirking of various types explains a firm’s
choice to enter into an LTA. However, concerns about opportunism also
explain a countertrend in the behavior of suppliers in their resistance to
entering into LTAs or to offer less than full cooperation with the LTAs by
parties subject to opportunism.
The LTAs provide many benefits to companies dealing with uncertainty
as they may contain protocols to share information and develop routines.22
These routines, developed in collaborative networks between buyers and
suppliers, help to foster an “organizationally rooted trust-as-reliability.”23
This trust develops with the routines and diverges from the early concept of
a different type of trust rooted in a willingness of “the parties to a network
[to] agree to forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of
others.”24 Sharing these routines allows buyers and suppliers to “generate
novel alignments of interest [with suppliers] that render collaboration more
feasible and more necessary.”25 The “input of others” becomes critical when
buyers develop or improve products and enhance production.26 Scholars of
the new forms of production and organization have detailed how LTAs can
facilitate simultaneous engineering and benchmarking,27 improve quality in
production, “establish a pragmatic learning process between
collaborators,”28 and “institutionalize learning.”29 These sharing protocols
and collaboration can generate benefits that extend beyond improving
production and can increase joint returns.30 When weighed against quality
22. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 98.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 98 (citing Walter Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms

of Organization, 12 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295, 303 (1990)).
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id. at 28–29.
27. See Gary Herrigel, Emerging Strategies and Forms of Governance in High-Wage
Component Manufacturing Regions, 11 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 45, 52, 66, 71 (2004)
(observing the increasing difficulty and necessity for firms to benchmark and “keep
abreast of and compare [their] own capacities to new developments” in the industry and
new production economy).
28. Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 5, at 83.
29. Id. at 88 (noting that such contracts also result in a convergence of the parties’
interests, which underscores a change in the contract away from risk allocation toward
“align[ing] parties’ divergent interests . . . .”).
30. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 29 (quoting Helper et al., supra note 5, at 445)
(“[O]nce the cooperative exploration of ambiguity begins, the returns to the partners from
further joint discoveries are so great that it pays to keep cooperating.”).
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control through warranty enforcement, these production protocols are
thought to be more effective ways “to better quality.”31 Thus, firms use
industrial strategies to solve a problem: firms can no longer profitably
acquire and maintain the required expertise in-house and need to collaborate
to survive.32 That strategy affects whether firms “make-or-buy” products
needed in production.33 Similarly, the strategy affects how firms are
governed: internally by bureaucratic fiat, by contracts of varying types with
external firms, or by some other mechanism.34
Where innovation requires both investment and collaboration, and
investments may be asymmetric, information sharing in an LTA may foster
informal enforcement by increasing transparency35 and observability.36
Professor Bernstein explains these LTAs as beneficial because “they create
a space in which private order can flourish.”37 The iterative exchange of
information and performance can deter opportunism and raise switching
costs.38 As each party learns about the other, the costs of finding a substitute
31. Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4 (manuscript at 8) (quoting John L. Pence and
P. Saacke, A Survey of Companies that Demand Supply Quality, 42 ANNUAL QUALITY
CONGRESS (1988 )) (discussing American Society for Quality Control study showing
benefits of managerial-focused contracts over traditional contracts).
32. See Helper et al., supra note 5, at 445, 463; see also WHITFORD, supra note 2, at
98 (discussing the increasingly symbiotic relationship between OEMs and suppliers,
enhancing “reliability” and “confidence”).
33. See Ann P. Bartel et al., Technological Change and the Make-or-Buy Decision,
30 J.L. ECON & ORG. 165, 170 (2014) (observing that the fraction of firms that find
outsourcing more profitable increases with pace of technological change); see also
Robert Gibbons, Firms (and Other Relationships), in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 186, 188
(Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001) (quoting Bruce Kogut et al., The Make-or-Cooperate
Decision in the Context of an Industry Network, in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS
348–65 (Nitin Nohria & Robert G. Eccles eds., 1992)) (evaluating the “make-or-buy”
decision in the context of “whether integration or non-integration facilitates the superior
relational contract”).
34. See infra Section VII.C (“Diversity of Arrangements”).
35. See Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 5, at 87 (discussing how transparency
“largely eliminates opportunism”); see also Helper et al., supra note 5, at 469–72
(explaining that pragmatic collaborations advance the collective knowledge of the parties
and curb opportunism through the sharing of information).
36. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 584 (observing that
contracts, to maintain cooperation, often give parties rights to conduct a root cause
analysis and monitor which “condition on information that in their absence would not be
observable . . .” thereby allowing for more informal enforcement possibilities).
37. Id. at 561 (noting however, presumably private order can flourish without LTAs
as parties engage in iterative investments and develop a relationship).
38. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 8, at 1382–84 (citing Ronald J. Gilson et al.,
Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 458–71, 448–51, 435, 486–89 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson et al.,
Contracting for Innovation]). For an earlier discussion of switching costs, see Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
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supplier or buyer increases for unknown parties. “Switching costs” acts as a
deterrent to early termination.39
III. SOURCING AND CONTRACTUAL CHOICES IN THE AGE OF DEVERTICALIZATION: AN EVOLVING LANDSCAPE
In the last several decades, the large integrated firm has de-verticalized.40
The pressure to cut costs, while keeping up with specialized expertise that is
expensive to develop in-house, led large and complex firms to develop
various types of arrangements with suppliers to source and organize
production.41 One scholar has described a “multiplicity” of suppliers
“sourcing strategies.”42 The diversity of suppliers’ arrangements responds
to various pressures exerted by large and complex firms as buyers. Suppliers
are struggling to respond to unpredictable and varying behavior by such
buyers.43
A. Collaboration
One arrangement in this de-verticalized economy that has received a great
deal of scholarly attention is the pragmatic collaborative arrangement
between large buyers and suppliers who participate in “learning by
monitoring.”44 To enhance quality and prevent costly errors on the
production line, buyers require suppliers to participate in root cause
analysis,45 benchmarking,46 and other routines to enhance quality.47
ASS’N. 55, 64 (1963). Of course, the iterative exchange of information may occur during
a relationship between a buyer and supplier without an LTA. The parties can take small
steps to accommodate another party and the other party may then respond in a kind of
overture and response scenario. An LTA is not needed to accomplish this. Gilson et al.,
Braiding, supra note 8, at 1384.
39. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 8, at 1383 n.10 (quoting Gilson et al.,
Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 435, 486–89).
40. See, e.g., WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 18 (describing a “shift” in the production
economy throughout the twenty-first century); Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic,
Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of
Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 985 (providing a list of some of the “pervasive
uncertaint[ies]” in present-day innovation contacts); Gilson et al., Contracting for
Innovation, supra note 38, at 438 (“[F]ear of hold-ups . . . no longer compels firms to
vertically integrate.”); Herrigel, supra note 27, at 55 (discussing OEMs’ concerns in the
“current environment of consistent vertical disintegration”).
41. See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 439–40.
42. Herrigel, supra note 27, at 46.
43. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99.
44. See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 435, 448.
45. John Paul MacDuffie, The Road to Root Cause: Shop-Floor Problem-Solving at
Three Auto Assembly Plants, 43 MGMT. SCI. 479, 486 (1997).
46. See Herrigel, supra note 27, at 73–74.
47. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 42, 98 (noting one of the key benefits of the routines
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Companies who may be dealing with “radical uncertainty” characteristics,
such as the biotechnology industry, may share information about a yet
unknown product or drug.48
Often the parties enter into LTAs with information-sharing protocols and
other provisions to encourage collaboration. Buyers and suppliers develop
routines that allow buyers to learn from suppliers and coordinate in ways that
facilitate collaboration.49 Collaboration may be necessary for buyers
because the cost of research and development for specialized expertise is too
great, making collaboration a cheaper way of acquiring the needed expertise.
Buyers and suppliers both benefit “from further joint discoveries” through
collaboration and information sharing.50 This collaboration and information
sharing between buyers and suppliers constitutes, according to some
scholars, a new “organizational revolution”51 that stands between vertical
integration and spot market transactions. Others have described these
arrangements as “neither fully transactional nor fully relational.”52
The sharing of information and new networks can occur in a variety of
contexts. For example, information sharing can occur when there is
uncertainty about what will be invented, as in the biotechnology industry, or
when there is uncertainty about emerging improvements, as in traditional
manufacturing industries. The information sharing takes the form of
simultaneous engineering, benchmarking, root cause analysis, and routines
all designed to improve the quality of the final product through incremental
improvements.53 The decision to share information, in the innovation or
industrial sector in a rapidly changing world with intense competition, might
suggest that this networked approach with information-sharing protocols is
the “key to survival”54 and that companies will converge on this path and

for information sharing and collaboration ideally leads to “jointly question” the
production process and that questioning both disrupts and leads to improvements); Sabel,
Real-Time Revolution, supra note 2, at 107 (“[P]ermanent uprising against habit . . . [a]
key to survival in an otherwise unmanageably turbulent world.”); see also Jennejohn,
Collaboration, supra note 5, at 101; Helper et al., supra note 5, at 472 (stating that
disruptions can change “static procedures” and thus lead to improvement).
48. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 28.
49. Helper et al., supra note 5, at 445 (“[The] pragmatic mechanisms . . . create and
maintain the conditions under which two or more firms can sustain collaboration.”).
50. Id.
51. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99, 100.
52. Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4 (manuscript at 1).
53. See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 449 (“[W]hat we
see emerging [is] . . . continuous improvement in product development and
engineering.”); see also id. at 438 (“[F]ear of hold-ups . . . no longer compels firms to
vertically integrate.”).
54. Sabel, Real-Time Revolution, supra note 2, at 107.
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become locked into this approach.55
B. Modularization
Of course, there are other ways to source production. Some suppliers
become large tier mega suppliers who collaborate in the way described
above. Sometimes OEM buyers pursue a modularization strategy with large
suppliers of “discrete subsystems or functional modules (example in an
automobile: front end, cockpit, drive train, common chassis platforms,
etc.).”56
Modularity, by reducing the need for coordination and
collaboration,57 could reduce costs. However, modularization, at least in the
automobile industry, has proven to be less successful as a sourcing strategy
than originally anticipated.58 Because automobiles are necessarily integrated
with one system affecting another, “to a degree that renders their separate
design almost impossible without sacrificing performance,”59
modularization “along the lines of black-box contract manufacturing is a
difficult proposition.”60
The adoption and then decline of modularization and the partial adoption
and failures in networks (particularly the hedging by suppliers in response to
opportunistic behavior by OEMs and the institutional blockages that hinder
buyers from fully collaborating),61 demonstrate that organizational choices,
are not static. Instead, organizational choices are contextual and driven by
the economics of the exchange, including all of the transaction costs. Such
organizational choices include whether to operate by a network, whether and
how much to collaborate or withhold information, whether to adopt
modularization as a sourcing strategy, or whether to resort to a discrete
market transaction. The choices about how much knowledge to retain in55. However, collaborative networking and the “forced openness of joint design and
learning by monitoring” is not necessarily the last stage of organizational development
as the collaboration itself is subject to failure for a number of reasons including “factional
conflicts” in firms that undermine the collaborative strategies themselves and by
opportunism in the form of misusing information. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99.
56. Id. at 61 (quoting Gary Herrigel & Wittke Volker, Varieties of Vertical
Disintegration: The Global Trend Toward Heterogeneous Supply Relations and the
Reproduction of Difference in US and German Manufacturing, in NATIONAL BUSINESS
SYSTEMS IN THE NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT 47 (Richard Whitley et al. eds., 2004)).
57. Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 5, at 142 (quoting Henry Smith,
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175,
1177 (2006)).
58. See Francois Fourcade & Christophe Midler, Modularisation in the Auto
Industry: Can Manufacturer’s Architectural Strategies Meet Supplier’s Sustainable
Profit Trajectories?, 4 INT’L J. AUTOMOTIVE TECH. & MGMT. 240, 241 (2004).
59. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 62 (quoting Herrigel, supra note 27, at 49).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 99.
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house may respond to a need by buyers to gauge how well the suppliers are
performing.62
The choice to organize production by sharing routines in a collaborative
network or to choose another way of sourcing production, such as
modularization, is context-dependent. There is not one organizational
solution to the problems that parties face. That same diversity of
arrangements extends not only to the type of supply arrangement for
sourcing production, but also to the choice of whether to formalize those
routines in an LTA or opt-out. These are all rational responses by buyers
and suppliers to the particular circumstances in product development and
sale, to the risks of failure, to the dangers of opportunism in settings of low
or high asset specificity, and to the tradeoffs that each party is making to
those risks and returns.
C. Opportunism and Sunk Costs
Empirical work by Professor Josh Whitford shows that the success of these
federated collaborations between buyers and suppliers is only “partial.”63
OEM buyers remain “deeply cautious about genuinely relying on supplier
firms,”64 and suppliers react to opportunistic behavior by OEM buyers by
hedging and withholding information, thereby reducing joint returns.65 The
choice of whether and how to organize production, whether to vertically
integrate, operate by discrete market transactions or to form collaborative
information networks and how fully to cooperate within these networks, is
affected by transaction costs and the fear of holdup. For example, owners
may vertically integrate to solve the holdup problem.66 A major driver of
vertical integration is profit capture. A company vertically integrating
decides to capture the profit that the supply company would otherwise accrue
to the supplier’s shareholders.67 Vertical integration may also be done to
deny competitive access from a supplier to another large OEM. Or a
company may decide to produce, and not buy, because of the cost of
62. Id. at 62–63 (noting the importance of knowledge retention to “evaluate the
performance of suppliers”).
63. See id. at 100 (disputing Sabel’s description of the new collaborative networks
as “an inescapable organizational revolution” by noting it “remains altogether partial”).
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. at 100 (discussing suppliers’ strategy of hedging to withhold information and
investment in response to “OEM unreliability”).
66. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 14, at 16; see also Jennejohn,
Collaboration, supra note 5, at 84–85.
67. See generally Anne Sraders, What Is Vertical Integration and What Are the
Benefits?, THE STREET (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/markets/what-isvertical-integration-and-what-are-the-benefits-14671684 (detailing the benefits of
vertical integration).
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transmitting to suppliers the knowledge of what is needed (“tacit
knowledge”) makes it easier and cheaper to produce the goods. 68
The economics of exchange, profit, minimizing frictions, and transaction
costs underlie organizational decisions about where the boundaries of the
firm should lie. Those same economic considerations drive the coordination
mechanisms adopted by OEM buyers to streamline the production process,
promote innovation, and expand the reach of informal non-contractual
relations. These coordination mechanisms decrease the importance for
delineating performance obligations under constant adjustment. The drive
to economize on transaction costs will affect other decisions made by
suppliers who will be subject to the same profit driver from the economic
exchange.
Operating by network and sharing information with a supplier governed
by an LTA “creates an information symmetricizing machine in which actors
must keep one another abreast of their intentions and capacities.”69 The
sharing of information also helps to curb opportunism as it raises switching
costs for both parties in the supply chain. A “virtuous circle” may result in
which parties learn more about each other’s “reliability” and
“competence,”70 which reinforces collaboration. These information-sharing
protocols are consistent with “Macaulay’s definition of contracts as ‘devices
for conducting exchanges.’”71
The choices of contractual form, decisions about structure, the inclusion
of detailed protocols, and cooperation during the relationship may also
respond to behavioral proclivities to opportunism of one’s collaborating
partner and changes in the relationship, such as the misuse of information by
the buyer.72 The context affects how fully one party cooperates and those
risks may also affect the decision to opt into or out of an LTA. Breakdowns
may also occur due to “factional conflicts”73 within an organization of buyers
that hinder collaboration and increase uncertainty for suppliers. The
withholding of information or hedging by the supplier represents a private

68. John Paul MacDuffie & Susan Helper, Creating Lean Suppliers: Diffusing Lean
Production Through the Supply Chain, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 118, 120 (1997)
(“Extensive tacit knowledge can develop in the supplier-customer relationship,
facilitating coordination of the respective expertise of the parties, particularly with
respect to complex value-added tasks such as product development.”).
69. Helper et al., supra note 5, at 472.
70. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99, 111.
71. David Campbell, What Do We Mean by the Non-Use of Contract?, in REVISITING
THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE
LYRICAL 159, 166 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013).
72. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 103.
73. Id. at 99.
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strategy to minimize the costs of opportunism.74 Instead of opting out of the
agreement, the least cost response may be hedging.
The decisions of how to operate and what organizational mode to use,
whether it is a network, hierarchy, or market transaction, whether to hedge
or not, and what contractual form to rely on (LTA or purchase order) for
governing production, are all responses to durable problems that parties face
in exchange relationships. One of the institutional choices suppliers make is
what type of contract to agree to — whether to enter into an LTA or to optout of such an agreement.
The same considerations that affect parties deciding how to structure their
organization of the supply chain, whether in a collaborative network or a
hierarchy or by market, affect the choice of whether to enter into an LTA.
Parties ask how can they increase joint returns and address durable problems
while minimizing the frictions that affect exchange relationships. The
empirical evidence from our survey demonstrates that the decision to enter
into an LTA is affected by the presence of large capital equipment costs, a
sunk cost with asset specificity.75 In all of the networks that have been
extensively studied in the automotive and innovation contexts, there are large
sunk costs, uncertainty, and a need to de-verticalize to capitalize on the
expertise of suppliers. Where such sunk costs are present, the parties cannot
simply exit without being at risk for losing sunk costs.76 The parties devise
74. See id. at 100.
75. See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra Q4 and Q6. As you can see from the chart below,

manufacturers indicating in Q4 that they acquire capital equipment at a significant cost
in sixy-seven percent or more of their transactions were more likely than the average
manufacturer in the sample to indicate that they would use an LTA in most of their
transactions.

Manufacuturers LTA/MSA Usage
Percentage of Respondents

All Manufacturers

Manufacturers with High Capital Costs

50%
40%

33%

32%

30%

0%

32%

29%

21%

20%
10%

37%

17%

0%
0 - 10%

11% - 25%
25% - 75%
Frequency of LTA/MSA Use

76% - 100%

76. See Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1675; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
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structures and routines that are embodied in a long term contract to deal with
uncertainty about the product and their partner’s reliability and competence.
Those routines create a “roadmap”77 or “scaffolding”78 for guiding
production, reducing uncertainty, and lessening the chances of shirking or
substandard goods. Those routines also lessen the risk of opportunism by
raising switching costs. As parties become embedded in these relationships,
that embeddedness substitutes for trust. It cements the relationship, protects
the sunk cost investments, and secures other protections, such as guaranteed
fixed prices or an option of ordering that protect sunk cost investments.
IV. WHY CHOOSE LTAS?
The decision by buyers and suppliers to enter into an LTA when the parties
have sunk costs — a result revealed by the survey — constitutes one mode
of protecting those sunk costs. When buyers and suppliers engage in joint
projects that require either party to have significant capital expenditures, the
parties may benefit from provisions in the LTA that encourage collaboration
and efficiency. Empirical work looking at collaborative agreements and
networks shows that provisions requiring shared information79 or cost
reductions80 often arise in an LTA. However, if the sharing protocols deter
opportunism and are costly to implement, then why would either the buyer
or the supplier decide to enter or avoid a formal LTA and in what
circumstances?
In answering that question, it may help to think about all the different ways
that knowledge about the other party’s reliability and the information needed
for error detection could be obtained and with what agreements. There is the
further question of how collaboration affects the arrangements. First, in
situations with multiple buyers, the supplier could develop a commodity
good and operate purchase-order-by-purchase-order while remaining
confident that it could exit and sell the commodity to others. Second, in a
supply arrangement with limited large buyers and multiple suppliers, a buyer
and supplier could exchange goods pursuant to a purchase order and reply.
Knowledge about the other party’s reliability and competence would emerge
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING
53 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS].
77. Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4 (manuscript at 1).
78. Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 40, at 988.
79. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 8, at 1405 (noting that parties contract to
“motivat[e] the iterative exchange of private information”); Gilson et al., Contracting for
Innovation, supra note 38, at 49–50 (referencing the Deere-Stanadyne agreement to show
how parties today may enter long-term contracts for the purpose of assessing parties’
“capabilities”).
80. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 76 (observing that OEMs and suppliers can
collaborate to reduce costs over time).
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gradually as the buyer continues to buy and the supplier continues to provide
goods. No LTA would be required for that knowledge about reliability and
competence to develop into trust. Third, in situations with a large buyer and
multiple suppliers, a supplier could invest a large amount in capital costs
without collaborating with the buyer. In that case the supplier might insist
on an LTA to guarantee that the buyer’s purchase obligations would defray
the cost of the capital equipment. An LTA governs, though there is no
collaboration.81 Fourth, in highly innovative settings with a scarcity of
suppliers (i.e. biopharmaceuticals), the parties might engage in a
collaborative project and enter into an LTA with sharing protocols.
Thus, the desire to recoup sunk costs and a firm’s bargaining power, rather
than innovation and uncertainty, is the distinguishing feature that may
influence parties to enter into an LTA.82 That conclusion may be warranted
because information obtained through an LTA could also be obtained by
other hierarchical management techniques and the trust could be built up
incrementally through the exchange of goods. Any buyer could draft a
purchase order insisting that a supplier submit to information-sharing
protocols. Trust about competence and reliability could build up over time.
However, if the buyer, such as an OEM, is investing in a model car and a
supplier is investing in a plant that will furnish a door for that model car, the
buyer and the supplier both need the security of a long-term commitment.
What does the LTA provide that could not be provided by benchmarking
or other routines? For the supplier there may be implicit protections against
early termination or even explicit protections of a long-term purchase
contract, even if qualified by contingencies such as meeting the
competition’s pricing. That long-term contract may exist in combination
with sharing protocols in which parties collaborate toward quality
improvements or innovations. The buyer wants an LTA to guarantee a price
and continuing supply, benefits that could not be achieved unilaterally or by
“management technique[s].”83 The buyer may be reluctant to invest in a
production facility without the benefit of an LTA guaranteeing price and
supply. In each case parties trade off and determine which institution,
contract, provisions, or organization will maximize joint benefits by
achieving their myriad of goals at the least cost.
Then, having entered a particular structure, the parties continue to make
adjustments, such as hedging, in response to new pressures, such as
opportunistic use of shared information. The decision about whether to enter
a network subject to a formalized LTA is only one of the many choices
81. Interview with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (June 16, 2017) (confidential source
on file with author).
82. Id.
83. Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 5, at 87.
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parties must make. Parties and suppliers make tradeoffs in order to lessen
the risks and costs of unremedied contractual hazards, but also decide on
choices about how fully to cooperate and whether to resist or hedge by
withholding information or failing to invest.84
Where there are no sunk costs or large capital equipment costs by
suppliers, suppliers may opt out of LTAs, perhaps deciding that the costs
extracted by the buyer in the LTAs outweigh any benefits of such
agreements. In particular, one such reason may be the onerous burdens on
suppliers to constantly reduce prices in response to buyer demands.85
Suppliers can simply exit to the market and find another buyer. LTAs may
be the least costly alternative for organizing production in the supply chain,
particularly when the suppliers seek to reduce uncertainty about the buyer by
continuing to deal with the buyer.
V. THE SURVEY APPROACH TO ANALYZING WHY FIRMS USE LTAS
At least some of the benefits of an LTA could be imposed by buyers
unilaterally or in a short terms and conditions section of a purchase order.86
Through such short term agreements, buyers can develop increased
knowledge about reliability and competence of suppliers, and benefits such
as informal enforcement, monitoring, and increases in switching costs can
occur without an LTA. The key question remains: why parties would enter
into an LTA or decide not to do so? What mechanism or institution will
achieve the parties’ goals and at what cost? Some industrial strategies, such
as the LTAs with learning routines, respond to new pressures on buyers to
enhance knowledge and improve quality under increased time pressures.
When implementing strategies in particular contexts, including the types of
contractual and non-contractual arrangements, parties consider how the
institutions selected will respond, not only to knowledge enhancement and
competitive pressures on quality and price, but also to problems of
opportunism and other durable problems in the supply chain. Switching
costs, with the resultant deterrence of opportunism, could be achieved in
other less costly ways without a formal LTA.
Current scholarship focusing on “exemplars,” or significant LTAs in the
innovation field,87 has identified increased transparency from LTA
information-sharing protocols as one reason to contract using an LTA.
Ideally, as information is shared in an iterative fashion, pursuant to the LTA,
parties’ uncertainties about each other are reduced and knowledge is
84.
85.
86.
87.

WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 100.
Id. at 81, 102.
See supra Section IV.
See generally Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38 (analyzing
the reasons companies choose to enter specific LTA-exemplar contracts).
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enhanced. That knowledge leads to improvement in production and the
development of new technologies.88 However, often it is the suppliers who
are being asked to share information, so LTAs may reduce uncertainty only
for the buyer.
This Article posits that the LTA is a governance mechanism or a
“machinery to ‘work things out’”89 that may not be necessary or costeffective when there are no idiosyncratic investments. Thus, the form of
contract is tied to the functions the parties seek to achieve, including the need
to protect investments. That need could affect both buyers and suppliers in
the supply chain. This Article supports Oliver Williamson’s theories of
contracting by providing empirical evidence that parties may undertake the
costs of “specialized governance structures” such as LTAs where there is
“considerable investment in transaction-specific assets.”90 As Williamson
explains, the “specialized structures come at great cost, and the question is
whether the costs can be justified.”91
This Article offers another justification for the LTA that is separate from
the “learning by monitoring” pragmatic collaboration that has been explored
deeply by other scholars. While the “learning by monitoring”92 devices and
routines in the newer forms of LTAs may be effective tools to deal with
problems with performance based on an “insufficient understanding of the
problem at hand, or even how to pose it in the first place,”93 they cannot
completely eliminate opportunism in a supply relationship. When the
problems faced by parties also include an “unwillingness” and “selfregarding motives,”94 the LTA offers security to protect parties who invest
large resources and might lose that investment or be subject to holdup after
making a large investment. A buyer might be reluctant to invest in a model
car without the security of long-term sourcing and price assurances.95 The
supplier might be reluctant to invest in building a factory to build doors for

88. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99 (explaining that “the forced openness of joint
design and learning by monitoring creates the conditions for a ‘virtuous circle,’” or a
waltz).
89. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 76, at 60 (coining the term
“machinery to ‘work things out’”).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 448.
93. Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic
Development 23 (Colum. L Sch. Ctr. Law & Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 102,
1993) [hereinafter Sabel, Learning by Monitoring], http://www2.law.columbia.edu/s
354abel/papers/Learning%20by%20Monitoring.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Interview with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (Jan. 25, 2019) (confidential source
on file with author).
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a customer without some security.96
Studying existing LTAs and situating them within industrial and
production strategies can elicit theories about the functions they serve, but
such studies do not shed light on why parties prefer certain arrangements
over others. By expanding the range to random manufacturers, the research
team hoped to shed light on why and when parties adopt an LTA or opt out.
Since parties could provide for submitting to collaboration outside an LTA
(for example, through provisions of a quality manual97), the question arises
when and under what circumstances an LTA is a cost-minimizing method of
achieving the parties’ goals? The prior focus on LTAs themselves, instead
of on the use or non-use of such agreements, means that important insights
about contractual preferences based on factors like industrial variations, sunk
costs, or firm size might have been overlooked. For instance, the research
team discovered significant differences in LTA usage across industries (see
graph below).98 Simply analyzing differing terms within LTAs across
various industries would not have demonstrated industrial variations in
usage, because such an analysis would not have gathered information from
firms that do not use LTAs.

96. Interview with Susan Helper, Professor of Law, in Cleveland, Ohio. (Feb. 21,
2017); see also Kostritsky Ice Survey infra Q4 and Q9 (showing the aggregated survey
responses).
97. See discussion infra Section IX.C (explaining that quality manuals dictate
purchase orders or terms and conditions).
98. See supra Figure 1 (finding that, based on survey responses, aerospace
companies are far more likely to use LTAs than other industries).

356

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9:3

Therefore, instead of focusing on the terms of high-profile LTAs like the
agreement between Apple and SCI,99 or between Eli Lilly & Emisphere Techs
Inc.,100 the research team designed a survey to shed light on the types of
agreements a random group of Ohio manufacturers used in their transactions,
including the choice to use LTAs or other arrangements. Using data from a
random sample of manufacturers allowed for empirical comparisons across
industries and firm sizes. In most instances, the buyers (often OEMs) draft
and dictate the terms in agreements to the suppliers.101 Thus, simply studying
terms of an LTA may not shed light on supplier thinking.
Since many of these LTAs are drafted by large OEMs or other buyers,
such as aerospace companies, and the information often travels almost
exclusively from the supplier to the buyer, the question arises as to when and
why LTAs will be either resisted or embraced by suppliers? When and why
would an LTA be used and result in overall cost minimization for each party?
Since the research team did not survey buyers in that capacity, we offer only
tentative answers on buyers based on an analysis of some LTAs and current
literature analyzing such agreements. Our results do shed empirical light on
the choices by suppliers that suggest that the choice of contractual form is
context-dependent, tied to sunk costs, and not a static choice, but one that
varies as the pressures on suppliers increase or change. That decision to
adopt or opt out of an LTA parallels other decisions suppliers make to
“hedge” in order to protect themselves against buyer misuse of
information.102
In analyzing the myriad of choices of suppliers to enter into an LTA, opt
out, render less than full cooperation under the agreement, or protect against
the risks of buyers licensing a supplier’s intellectual property by only
furnishing older technology that is already patented,103 it helps to situate
those choices within a bargaining model. Each party approaches an
99. Fountain Manufacturing Agreement between Apple Computer, Inc. and SCI
Systems, Inc., ONECLE INC. (May 31, 1996), https://contracts.onecle.com/apple/
scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml [hereinafter Apple-SCI Agreement]; see also Gilson et al.,
Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 463 (“SCI was, at the time [of the
agreement with Apple], the largest contract manufacturer”).
100. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-1504, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23245, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 25, 2006).
101. See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra Q8 and Q9 (showing the aggregated survey
responses to Q8 and Q9, which in turn demonstrate: (1) the proportion of terms that
manufacturers can dictate; and (2) the proportion of manufacturers who reported that the
terms are dictated to them).
102. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 51.
103. See Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1644–47 (discussing the problems parties face
regarding opportunism and the appropriation of intellectual property); see also Interview
with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (Aug. 8, 2018) (confidential source on file with author).
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exchange with its own private goals (to solve durable problems such as
opportunism) and the parties will reach a particular bargain only if the
benefits of achieving those goals outweigh the costs. Similarly, firms will
constantly look for an arrangement that minimizes their costs while
controlling contractual hazards, thereby maximizing value. Once the entire
universe of agreements is considered, including factors that incline suppliers
to use an LTA or to operate under other documents, it becomes possible to
tie the parties’ choice of form to a model of bargaining under conditions that
include bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism.104 Under this
model, one considers how parties in a transaction seek to achieve their
overall goals of wealth maximization while minimizing costs.
VI. SURVEY METHODOLOGY
To evaluate the key question of why suppliers decide to use an LTA, the
research team developed a survey of thirty-four questions about topics
regarding why firms use LTAs, how often firms use LTAs, when firms
engage in information-sharing between the buyers and suppliers, and the
enforceability of LTAs and Master Supply Agreements (“MSA”).105 The
survey was designed to determine if and when LTAs were used by
manufacturers.106
The manufacturers in the survey predominantly
represented suppliers in buyer and supplier arrangements.
To identify survey participants, our research team obtained a list of 1,875
Ohio-based manufacturers from the Mergent Intellect database. The
research team identified manufacturers by using the super sector Northern
American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”) codes related to
manufacturing.107 Data from Mergent Intellect included each manufacturer’s
104. See Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1656–57.
105. The questions regarding information sharing also touched on collaboration

between the manufacturers and the buyers. Recent scholars have tied the informationsharing protocols in LTAs to the benefits of informal enforcement of parties’
arrangements. The survey and interview questions were designed to elicit whether
information sharing took place in the absence of an LTA and if so, at what levels (i.e.,
did information sharing occur at the same rate as occurred with an LTA?). Although the
information sharing and collaboration questions helped the research team identify
companies that might be concerned about intellectual property, the majority of
respondents did not indicate that intellectual property or highly innovative collaborations
were a major concern.
106. Part of the interest in framing the survey in this manner arose when a General
Counsel I interviewed suggested that his company tried to avoid signing LTAs. See
Interview with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (Aug. 8, 2018) (confidential source on file
with author).
107. See NAICS codes 31 through 33. See generally NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET
33, 143–311 (2017), https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/2017_NAIC
S_Manual.pdf (classifying industries in the manufacturing sector).
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name, phone number, physical address, and industry sub-sector. A paperbased mail survey was sent to the manufacturers obtained on the original list.
After the first paper mailing, our team received fifty-eight responses either
by mail or online.
The research team scrubbed the list to remove any duplicate companies or
companies that had gone out of business, reducing the total number of
“potentially active” manufacturers to 1,458. Then, the research team
manually searched all “potentially active” manufacturers online to find their
email addresses for an online survey. Of the 1,458 “potentially active”
manufacturers, the research team found email addresses for 667
manufacturers and deemed them “likely active.”108 An email survey was
sent to the 667 “likely active” manufacturers. Sixty-nine manufacturers
returned an additional eleven survey responses. Thus, the overall survey
response rate was 3.7 percent for all companies in the original database, 4.7
percent for “potentially active” manufacturers, and 10.3 percent for “likely
active” manufacturers.
In addition to the survey, the research team conducted several one-on-one
interviews with manufacturers to gather more qualitative data on LTA usage.
The in-person interviews were especially helpful in understanding how
highly innovative companies use (or do not use) LTAs within the context of
protecting intellectual property. Table 1 outlines the annual sales revenue of
each of the five manufacturers interviewed.
Table 1: Annual Sales Revenue of Interviewed Manufacturers
Company
2017 Annual Sales Revenue in USD
1
$6.3 Billion
2
$12.03 Billion
3
$3.2 Billion
4
$287 Million
5
$20.4 Billion
VII. SURVEY RESULTS
A. LTA Usage
Our survey of Ohio manufactures indicated that the majority of
respondents use LTAs infrequently. Only seventeen percent of respondents
(eleven of sixty-three manufacturers) indicated that they used LTAs or
MSAs in seventy-six percent or more of their transactions (see Table 2).
Twenty-four percent of all manufacturers indicated that transactions with
108. A selection of companies without email addresses were contacted by phone but
the majority were out of business.
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LTAs or MSAs accounted for seventy-six percent or more of their revenues
(see Table 3). This tends to indicate that firms use MSAs and LTAs for highrevenue transactions disproportionately.
Table 2: Count of Manufacturers by LTA Usage as a Percentage of
Transactions
LTA Usage
Manufacturers
0-10%
21
11-25%
13
26-75%
18
76-100%
11
Table 3: Count of Manufacturers by LTA Usage as a Percentage of
Revenues
LTA Usage
Manufacturers
0-25%
24
26-50%
16
51-75%
8
76-100%
15
In addition, sixty-five percent of respondents indicated that they
predominately produced customizable goods and twenty-nine percent of
respondents indicated that they spent a significant amount of money on
capital goods for a specific buyer in most of their transactions. However,
when looking only at the subsection of manufacturers that indicated that they
used LTAs in most of their transactions,109 seventy-three percent of
manufacturers indicated that they predominately produced customizable
goods and sixty percent of respondents indicated that they spent a significant
amount of money on capital goods for a specific buyer.
LTA usage also varied significantly across industries. Thirty-two percent
of automotive manufacturers and fifty percent of aerospace manufacturers
used an LTA most of the time. No other industry indicated that they used
LTAs in most of their transactions (see Tables 4 and 5).

109. This subset consists of the eleven manufacturers that indicated that they use
LTAs in seventy-six percent or more of their transactions.
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Table 4: Percentage of Survey Respondents by Industry and LTA
Usage
Industry
Auto
Aerospace
Other
All Companies

0-10%
11-25%
25-75%
LTA Usage LTA Usage LTA Usage
35%
0%
44%
33%

15%
20%
25%
21%

20%
30%
34%
29%

76-100%
LTA Usage
30%
50%
0%
17%

Table 5: Counts of Survey Respondents by Industry and LTA Usage
Industry
Auto
Aerospace
Other
All Companies

0-10%
11-25%
25-75%
LTA Usage LTA Usage LTA Usage
7
0
14
21

3
2
8
13

4
3
11
18

76-100%
LTA Usage
6
5
0
11

B. Customizable vs. Fungible Good
Generally, companies noted that LTAs could be used as a shield against
loss from investments in capital equipment. The most important reasons to
use LTAs or MSAs in the event of a later lawsuit were: (1) to protect capital
equipment costs or tooling costs; (2) indemnity for intellectual property
infringement; and (3) as a damages cap.110 Recouping capital equipment
costs is particularly important when the relationship between the supplier
and buyer has terminated because the continuing purchase commitment
would have ended prematurely. However, the top answer that manufacturers
gave for entering into LTAs, without the concern of a future lawsuit, was
“security of continuing commitment from the buyer.”111 Continuing
commitment from the buyer would be particularly important where there
were large sunk costs that could only be recouped by multiple purchases
from the buyer over time. When the manufacturer is asked about what
matters most, both in the context of a possible lawsuit and in an open-ended
context, the protection of sunk costs or protection of a continuing purchase

110. See Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1638, n.75.
111. See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra Q9 (showing the aggregated survey responses to

Q9).
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obligation features prominently.112 In both cases there seem to be large
investments that require contractual protection.
The second most selected reason for agreeing to an LTA was the absence
of any choice by the manufacturer due to the superior leverage of the buyer.
Usually LTAs are used by the largest companies that purchase goods in large
volumes. Large and complex companies often have increased internal
coordination costs and will use management techniques to increase internal
efficiencies.113 Many of these management techniques have analogous
managerial provisions that can be found in LTAs dictating the intra-firm
behavior between suppliers and buyers.114 Over seventy-eight percent of
respondents said that the most common characteristic between industries that
insist on LTAs or MSAs is a large buyer or an OEM.115 The size of the buyer
may also indicate that more revenue is generated from sales to such buyers
and those higher revenues may justify the LTAs’ higher cost. Large sunk
cost investments by suppliers are also likely to be present with large OEMs
as buyers. Thus, fifty percent of manufacturers frequently using LTAs said
that the most important reason for signing an LTA was because it was
dictated by the buyer.
C. Diversity of Arrangements
As shown in Table 6, manufacturers that never, or seldom use LTAs,
indicated that they did not use LTAs primarily because they were already
doing business under other documents. Terms and conditions and purchase
orders were the most likely documents to govern the transaction if an LTA
was not used. Although suppliers might reap the benefits from using an LTA
as a shield to protect capital expenditures and to secure a continuing
commitment, suppliers have less incentive to enter into LTAs if they are
protected under other agreements. The greater cost associated with
negotiating an LTA, including the onerous provisions imposed by buyers,
the less companies may be able to justify using such a contractual
arrangement. However, the company may be justified in using an LTA if it
incurs large capital costs that can only be recouped through a specific
provision in the LTA or through a continuing commitment to purchase.

112. The protection of sunk costs in manufacturing, including capital equipment and
investments in lean production or other specialized processes, is analogous to the need
to protect intellectual property for “incentivizing creative activity.” Matthew Jennejohn,
The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281, 284 (2016)
[hereinafter Jennejohn, Private Order].
113. See Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3).
114. Id.
115. See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra Q14.
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Table 6: Primary Reasons for Not Using an LTA
Primary Reason

Percentage of
Manufacturers
Seldom Using
LTAs116

Percentage of All
Manufacturers

Already doing business
under other documents such
as terms and conditions or
purchase order

39%

29%

Terms too onerous

36%

45%

Price reduction requirements
too onerous

12%

12%

Do not want to allow buyer
a right to terminate for
convenience

6%

5%

Other

6%

8%

Do not want to sign a
competition out clause

0%

2%

Another important reason why manufacturers did not use LTAs was
because LTA terms were considered too onerous. In many instances, the
buyer unilaterally dictates the terms of the LTA to the manufacturer. Sixty
percent of manufacturers said that they drafted less than ten percent of their
LTAs and only twelve percent of manufacturers drafted the vast majority of
their LTAs. Companies that more frequently used LTAs said that their
primary reason not to sign an LTA was due to terms being too onerous,
followed by not wanting to sign a competition out clause, and that they were
already doing business under other documents. If a supplier operates in an
industry where LTAs are the norm and are often dictated by the buyer, they
might only refuse to engage in the LTAs if the buyer has a bad reputation for
reneging on LTA terms or the buyer negotiated the terms to unilaterally
benefit themselves.117 One of the respondents indicated that if they have a
strong competitive position against the buyer they would not want to lock in
116. See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra Q6 and Q12 (finding that this group of
respondents indicated that they use LTAs in twenty-five percent or less of their
transactions).
117. See generally Advantages of Long Term Contracts, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.
upcounsel.com/advantages-of-long-term-contracts (last visited Nov. 28, 2020)
(explaining the advantages and disadvantages of LTAs in different industries).
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prices with an LTA. Another manufacturer that often signed LTAs indicated
that the company would be hesitant to sign an LTA if the buyer was known
to constantly change or cancel LTA terms to benefit themselves.
D. Information Sharing: How Does it Occur?
The survey revealed that generally suppliers are willing to share
information within the context of an LTA; eighty-two percent of respondents
said they would share information about costs or quality if they signed an
LTA. In addition, survey results indicated that manufacturers might be
willing to share information outside of an LTA. If there is no LTA signed,
companies are split on whether they would share information with their
buyers, especially related to costs; fifty-six percent of companies say they
would share information. Seventy percent of respondents said that they were
not required to attend any meetings because of the LTA, but seventy-four
percent of manufacturers not required to attend meetings indicated that they
would attend meetings with the buyer anyway.
Manufacturers indicated they would be more likely to share information
if the government requires a cost breakdown or they are working with an
aerospace or large firm. For companies that frequently use LTAs, seventythree percent of respondents noted that they would share information even if
they did not sign an LTA, making them the most likely group to share
information with buyers. Manufacturers that frequently used LTAs reported
that they shared information because they were required to do so by the
buyer118 and because it was an industry certification requirement.119 Sixty
percent of respondents said that they need to prequalify as a supplier to sell
their products even without an LTA most of the time. Purchase orders, terms
and conditions, and LTAs can all require an ongoing quality assessment by
the buyer. Seventy-one percent of respondents indicated that their products
had to comply with a buyer’s quality or excellence manual under a purchase
order or terms and conditions most of the time. An ongoing quality
assessment is common under the buyers’ terms and conditions.120
118. Suppliers indicated they would share information even without an LTA due to
asymmetric bargaining power between themselves and the buyer.
119. See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra Q11 (showing that when asked to explain why
suppliers share information, respondents provided the following anecdotal responses:
“[Buyer] demands to see costs and accounting data,” “often required in USG
contracting,” and “industry certification requirement”).
120. See, e.g., FORD MOTOR CO., GLOBAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR NONPRODUCTION GOODS AND SERVICES ¶ 15(a) (2007), http://www.troydm.com/Shared/
Repository/Web_Guides/Global_Non_production_Terms_and_Conditions.pdf
(“Seller . . . will discuss with Buyer . . . any potential design, quality or manufacturing
problems with Supplies Seller worked on or produced pursuant to a Purchase Order.”);
id. ¶ 20(a)(ii) (permitting buyer to “[v]iew any facility or process relating to the Supplies
or the Purchase Order, including those relating to production quality”); APPLE,
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“Hedging”121 is another type of response to an LTA. Instead of actually
opting out of an LTA, suppliers sign them and then hedge to protect against
buyer opportunism — another way suppliers can minimize costs. The
hedging by suppliers is part of a pattern of holding back information to hedge
and self-protect.122 Respondents noted they would not share information in
cases where the buyer does not request it or there are no industry standards
that make information sharing mandatory. Individual respondents from the
survey noted that if they sold proprietary products, they would be more
hesitant to share information with their buyers. Suppliers are worried about
sharing information about anything that would allow the buyer to undercut
the supplier and buy from someone else, including costs.123
E. Collaboration
Figure 2 displays the frequency of LTA usage by the frequency of
collaboration. A few companies indicated that most of their products were
co-designed in collaboration with the buyer. Of the respondents that
collaborated, eighty-seven percent said that the collaboration with the buyer
was at least moderately successful. However, the model of collaboration
seemed to vary widely across respondents. Thirty-four percent of
respondents said that buyers supplied them with blueprints less than ten
percent of the time, but another thirty-seven percent of respondents said that
buyers supplied them with blueprints over seventy-five percent of the time.
Those that did collaborate seemed only slightly more inclined to use an LTA.

PURCHASE AGREEMENT, PURCHASE ORDER TERMS AND CONDITIONS ¶ 6 (n.d.),
https://www.apple.com/legal/procurement/docs/OL-APAC-AP_v.1.0.pdf (last visited
Nov. 28, 2020) (permitting Apple to inspect, and test goods before acceptance); EATON
INDUS., GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE, SELLING POLICY, DISTRIBUTION AND
CONTROL PRODUCTS, AND SERVICE SOLUTIONS 2 (2017), https://www.eaton.com/
ecm/groups/public/@pub/@electrical/documents/content/sp03000001k.pdf (permitting
buyer to “witness testing” at seller’s factory for an additional fee).
121. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99.
122. See id. at 103–04.
123. See id. at 104.
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F. Enforceability of LTAs
The presence of the quantity term ensures that the agreement is
enforceable. Accordingly, a quantity term may be the best way to ensure
that the continuing obligation to purchase is enforceable, thereby helping to
defray the sunk costs. However, only forty-five percent of respondents said
that most of the time when they signed an LTA it would include a quantity
term (minimum or exact quantity). Many manufactures noted they were
unsure if an LTA without a quantity term would be enforceable and twenty
percent responded that they believed an LTA without a quantity term would
not be enforceable. Forty-four percent of manufacturers believed that an
LTA without a quantity term would become enforceable at signing, while
twenty-nine percent of manufacturers believed it would become enforceable
when a purchase order was signed.
For manufacturers that use LTAs the most frequently, only thirty-six
percent included a quantity term in most of their agreements. For the
companies that used an LTA most of the time, forty-five percent believed
the LTA would become enforceable when the first purchase order was
signed. Twenty-seven percent believed it was enforceable at the time of
signing the LTA. The discrepancy in responses between frequent LTA users
and infrequent or non-LTA users might be due to a lack of awareness about
the functioning of LTAs among firms that rarely use them.
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Termination Clauses also impact a supplier’s ability to protect sunk costs
in LTAs. Figure 3 shows the percentage of agreements with termination for
convenience clauses. Thirty-eight percent of suppliers said that a buyer can
terminate for convenience very rarely, while another thirty-two percent said
a buyer can terminate for convenience most of the time.

Many companies said that they would allow a buyer to terminate an
agreement, even without a termination for convenience clause, if their
tooling and investment costs had been repaid. Allowing termination for
convenience or for decreased demand seems to shift the risk of fluctuations
in demand to the supplier.124 This explanation suggests that parties will make
adjustments that are not required, but only if there is reciprocal protection.
The supplier adjusts and allows for early termination, but only if the supplier
is protected through repayment of the tooling and investment costs. These
adjustments can be made outside the contract. As always, the parties weigh
the benefits and costs of such adjustments. The supplier may be willing to
accept that allocation because the supplier is better able to “redeploy
manufacturing assets to another purpose” more easily than a buyer.125
Although firms might elect the protections of an LTA, they are highly
unlikely to use legal remedies if a dispute arises. The vast majority of
124. See Matthew Viator, Termination for Convenience Can Your Customer
Terminate You Without Good Reason?, LEVELSET, https://www.levelset.com/blog/
termination-for-convenience/ (last updated Apr. 20, 2020) (“When the customer realizes
they’re going to run out of cash, it might be safer (and cheaper) to terminate the
agreement before it’s too late.”).
125. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 586.
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manufacturers, ninety-two percent, said they would almost never resort to
suing over a dispute of an LTA. This finding supports the hypothesis that
firms must derive some implicit benefit outside of legal protections for
engaging in an LTA.
VIII. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
In general, our survey results revealed that the majority of Ohio
manufacturers used LTAs infrequently. However, LTA usage varied
significantly across industries. The high percentage of usage of LTAs by
automotive and aerospace manufacturers may be explained by the leverage
those buyers yield over suppliers,126 or the high collaboration costs
associated with the industries. The presence of those sunk costs makes it
important to control opportunism by the buyer in some manner since an exit
is not easy as it is for fungible goods. This explanation is consistent with
anecdotal feedback from a parts supplier who indicated that his company
rarely used LTAs because, as a catalog supplier, his products could be easily
sold to other buyers.127
The fact that the majority of manufacturers that used LTAs in most of their
transactions had customizable goods is an important finding. If a product is
customized for a particular buyer, and is not fungible, the supplier may have
invested sunk costs toward customization. That investment makes a resale
to others and an easy exit difficult and costly. Where such vulnerabilities
exist, the need for protection may justify the costs of LTAs. In particular,
the supplier can negotiate contractual protections for sunk costs or a
continuing commitment to purchase. This negotiation can help defray the
sunk cost investment or some other implicit protection such as helping a
supplier to enter a new line of business when the market for the buyer’s
minivan collapsed.
While the most frequently selected reason that manufacturers gave for
entering into LTAs without the concern of a future lawsuit was the security
of a continuing commitment from the buyer, the second most selected reason
was the absence of any choice due to the superior leverage of the buyer. This
second factor may also be related to the presence of sunk costs. The larger
buyers, such as OEMs in the automotive industry or airplane manufacturers,
have the leverage to dictate their terms. Further, these relationships also
likely require large sunk cost investments from their suppliers. Sunk costs
that occur in the context of a buyer-supplier relationship are also likely to
126. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 12, at 954 (discussing “economic power”
of original equipment manufacturers).
127. Interview with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (Feb. 22, 2017) (confidential source
on file with author) (interviewing firm with over $10 billion in sales for informational
purposes).
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have the potential for opportunism because sunk costs are endemic and will
occur when bounded rationality prevents a contractual control mechanism.128
The sunk costs lead to a fundamental transformation of the supplier
relationship making exit costly or impossible. In the context of their
relationship, controlling opportunism will be important, but difficult,
because of the myriad of ways in which a buyer or supplier may act
opportunistically, but which cannot be anticipated. Because the contract will
not be able to control the problem, there may be other governance strategies.
There are many possible solutions to opportunism when large sunk costs
are present. One structural solution is vertical integration.129 Buyers could
control external suppliers who could holdup buyers once the parties were
locked in a bilateral dependent relationship through vertical integration.130
However, vertical integration has become less efficient as the specialized
research and development (“R&D”) required for innovation is so costly that
it makes sense to outsource it externally to other firms. Thus, the decision
to outsource is driven by weighing the costs and benefits of vertically
integrating, which includes the costs of R&D, the benefits of profit capture,
and the possible holdup costs from outsourcing. As outsourcing increases,
the cost of holdup has become less of a problem than once anticipated.131
Because suppliers do not want to jeopardize future business with buyers,
since that would be “suicide,”132 they are reluctant to extort through holdup.
However, the need to minimize frictions such as opportunism, facilitate
coordination, and control entropy remain current problems for both buyers
and suppliers. The LTA, with its offer of implicit protections, security, and
cementing relationships,133 offers an incentive for the supplier to invest in
the relationship. The LTA operates as a protective safeguard that mitigates
opportunistic behavior by buyers. This safeguard encourages sunk cost
128. See ELLEN M. PINT & LAURA H. BALDWIN, RAND CORP., STRATEGIC SOURCING:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 10 (1997)
(“Contracts can protect transaction-specific investments to some extent, but bounded
rationality prevents contracts from specifying all possible contingencies. As contracts
become more flexible, they allow more potential for opportunism.”).
129. See generally WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 76 (providing
helpful background information on vertical integration and a detailed analysis of the
strategy).
130. See Marie-Laure Allain et al., Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up, 83
REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 1 (2016) (acknowledging that previous scholarship in the field has
identified “vertical integration as a solution to hold-up problems” but ultimately
disagreeing with aforementioned scholars regarding their characterization of vertical
integration as a solution to the hold-up problem).
131. Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 12, at 975 (explaining that hold-up power of
supplier is limited due to fear that hold-up will result in a loss of future business).
132. Id.; see also Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 438.
133. Interview with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (Aug. 22, 2017) (confidential source
on file with author).
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investments by suppliers and helps to minimize the cost of uncontrolled
opportunism. The value of that safeguard may diminish if the supplier
suspects that the buyer will renege on its implicit commitments or on
contractual commitments or opportunistically claim that the goods are
defective. The LTAs furnish other cost-minimizing features, such as lowcost self-help remedies, when the product is defective or prices
“competition-out” clauses to protect the buyers against the “China price.”134
The fact that only approximately one-third of frequent LTA users in our
survey insisted on a quantity term that would make the agreement legally
enforceable indicates that the value of the LTA for suppliers may lie in other
non-contractual protections offered by the LTA. This includes implicit
contracts that prompt buyers to protect suppliers even when not legally
obligated to do so.135 The absence of a quantity term might also indicate that
the supplier is relying on other constraints, such as switching costs, that will
make it difficult to terminate the relationship.136 Finally, even if there is no
quantity requirement, and the supplier has large sunk costs, capital
equipment, or tooling, once the first purchase order is issued, the agreement
becomes enforceable. Additionally, there may be a specific provision on
reimbursement for, or ownership of, equipment costs that is enforceable once
the purchase order is issued. In these instances, the fact that the LTA may
not contain an enforceable continuing purchase obligation may not be
important because that would matter only if the cost of the capital equipment
could not be otherwise recovered.
IX. LTA USAGE WITHIN A BARGAINING LENS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
In order to understand the significance of the survey results, they must be
situated within the context of a bargaining lens and a model of economic
behavior including bounded rationality, sunk costs, and multi-faceted
opportunism. The choice of a contractual form may best be understood in
terms of how the arrangement responds to durable contractual hazards that
each of the parties face.137 If contractual hazards remain uncontrolled either
by contract or some governance mechanism, there will be price adjustments
134. John Paul MacDuffie & Susan Helper, Collaboration in Supply Chains with and
without Trust, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING
TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 417, 420 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds.,
2006).
135. See Esser, supra note 10, at 594 (noting that parties with a pattern of
collaboration rely on various implicit mechanisms to fill in contractual gaps).
136. This protection is important when sunk costs are present.
137. See Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Mitigating Contractual Hazards:
Unilateral Options and Contract Length, 19 RAND J. ECON. 327, 328 (1988) (suggesting
that “the importance of [considering the] contractual hazards [when] . . . determining . . .
the design of [the contract] has become increasingly apparent”).
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to reflect the uncontrolled hazard.138 Each firm will sacrifice some of its
interests to accommodate the other party, but only if their bargain minimizes
costs and advances other interests.
A. Cost Minimization and Opportunism
The buyer faces uncertainty about the quality of the product from the
supplier,139 and about the competence and ability of the supplier. The
supplier faces uncertainty about potential opportunism.140 Opportunism
could occur if the supplier invests large sunk costs and the buyer terminates
early. Suppliers also face the prospect of buyers appropriating intellectual
or other property.141 The parties’ agreements must also serve a planning and
centralization of terms function.142 Each party faces the bargaining process
with its own private goals and will reach an agreement only if the benefits of
achieving those goals through a particular type or form of agreement
outweigh the costs. Firms seek a combination of strategies, both contractual
and informal, that will minimize its costs while maximizing its benefits. One
party may enter a formal contract largely for the implicit contracts that form
in the wake of the formal contract.143 Another party may enter the formal
agreement because of particular benefits an LTA offers, such as shifting the
risk of decreased demand to the other party through a termination for
convenience clause.144 The strategies are not static as they may change in
response to behavior by the other party that hinder goal achievement, are
contextual, and respond to the different factors, such as asset specificity or
large capital equipment costs.
In some ways, each party, while seeking to minimize its own costs to
advance its projects and maximize value, realizes that it must help the
138. See WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 14, at 62 (explaining that
“technology (k), contractual governance/safeguards (s) and price (p) are fully interactive
and are determined simultaneously”).
139. This uncertainty is heightened in the case of collaborating on an innovative
product, such as a new drug or medical device, since the parties cannot draft a complete
contract that identifies the product.
140. Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1647–49 (discussing the problems buyers and
sellers alike face regarding opportunism); Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation,
supra note 38, at 438–39.
141. Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1702–03 (observing the inadequacy of “lowpowered sanctions” where a “party plans to end the relationship by appropriating
intellectual property of the other party”); see also Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can
Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks?, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018).
142. Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1673 (noting that ease of planning and centralization
of decision making are benefits of LTAs); see also Esser, supra note 10, at 594.
143. Esser, supra note 10, at 594.
144. See Viator, supra note 124 (“When the customer realizes they’re going to run
out of cash, it might be safer (and cheaper) to terminate the agreement before it’s too
late.”).
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counterparty minimize the costs of their project. The key is reciprocity.145
There is an implicit agreement that one party will minimize its costs and the
counterparty’s costs, but only up to a point. When the costs of the
accommodation to the other party are large, or the other party acts in an
opportunistic manner, or there is a lack of trust, one party may take actions
to protect itself and in doing so absorb less of the counterparty’s cost
minimization needs. As one party attempts to cost minimize at the expense
of the other, there will be less accommodation, or a party may self-protect,
or hedge and share less information.146 At a certain point, cost minimization
may actually result in litigation. When the demands of the counterparty are
too great, litigation may be the only way to minimize costs.
B. Non-Contractual Cost Minimization Alternatives
It is important to understand that there may be non-contractual costminimizing solutions that lie outside the LTA or informal enforcement. For
example, parties in the supply chain could use non-contractual mechanisms,
such as insurance or a corporate structuring,147 that give buyers more control
over their suppliers. To answer the question of why buyers would enter into
LTAs, one must begin with a bargaining model in which each party weighs
the cost of drafting against the risk of not drafting further and operating
purchase-order-by-purchase-order. What are the various ways that buyers
could achieve their goals in ways that would be least costly? What are the
goals that they could accomplish using terms and conditions, a quality
manual, and requirements of pre-certification or other means to assure the
quality of supplier’s products and processes? Many of these provisions, such
as supplier scorecards,148 the International Organization for Standardization

145. KENNETH BINMORE, NATURAL JUSTICE 10 (2005) (discussing “rational
reciprocity”).
146. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 100.
147. Interview with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (Apr. 2017) (confidential source on
file with author).
148. NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, NI SUPPLIER HANDBOOK 13 (2018), http://www.
ni.com/content/dam/web/pdfs/20181002_FINAL_32652_Supplier_handbook_2018_Lt
r_WR.pdf (stating that “select suppliers” are those that usually “appear on the [National
Instruments] ‘top 80 percent of [National annual] spend’”); CUMMINS INC., SUPPLIER
HANDBOOK (CUSTOMER-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS) 27 (2019), https://public.cummins.
com/sites/CSP/SiteCollectionDocuments/StandardsandProcesses/SupplierQuality/Cum
mins%20Inc.-Supplier%20Handbook%20(Customer%20Specific%20Requirements)
.pdf (stating that Cummins “use[s] the Supplier Balanced Scorecard to evaluate customer
satisfaction with selected external production and service suppliers”).
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(“ISO”) Certification,149 and compliance with the buyer’s quality manual,150
can all be imposed hierarchically in a top down manner151 through a purchase
order or terms and conditions through an online portal without an LTA.
For example, buyers can dictate that suppliers must supply products that
comply with their quality manual in their purchase orders or terms and
conditions.152 Even without the consent of the supplier in an LTA, the buyer
can stipulate that to even be considered as a supplier, companies must
comply with the buyer’s quality manual. Buyers might also require suppliers
to warrant that their products comply with any buyer excellence or quality
manual in their purchase orders or terms and conditions. The scorecards,
ISO Certification, and the quality manual give the buyer low-cost ways of
minimizing misunderstandings about quality and setting standards and help
149. Companies will often require that their suppliers obtain or be ISO certified (and
that this certification was done by an accredited certification body). One example of an
international accreditation body is the International Accreditation Forum, and an
example of a domestic accreditation body is NSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board.
See JOHN DEERE, SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL — PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 6 (2015),
https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/wcm/connect/jdsn/e68e89f6-cb3a-4306-8a0a5beeabe61fab/english.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (“[S]uppliers in the John Deere supply
chain should become compliant to the ISO/TS 16949.”); KOHLER CO., GLOBAL SUPPLIER
QUALITY MANUAL 8 (2013), http://resources.kohler.com/corporate/kohler/pdf/supplier/
GlobalSupplierQualityManual_English.pdf (“Kohler prefers suppliers of production
materials with proof of certification to ISO 9001 or ISO/TS 16949 by an accredited
registrar.”).
150. See KOHLER CO., GLOBAL SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL, supra note 149, at 7
(“Prior to being awarded business from Kohler all new suppliers must read the Kohler
Global Supplier Quality Manual and then confirm agreement that they will comply with
its content and requirements through a method agreed with their Kohler purchasing
contact.”); JOHN DEERE, SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL – PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, supra
note 149, at 2 (stating that compliance with the JD Supplier Quality Manual is a
precondition for all John Deere suppliers); NCR CORP., SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL 4
(2015), https://www.ncr.com/content/dam/ncrcom/content-type/documents/ncr-supplie
r-quality-manual.pdf (“These Quality requirements apply to all Suppliers providing
products, parts, modules, assemblies or components . . . to NCR plants or NCR contract
manufacturers or, on NCR’s behalf, directly to NCR’s customers (each, an ‘NCR
Designated Purchaser’).”); NAVISTAR, INTEGRATED SUPPLIER QUALITY REQUIREMENTS
8 (2019), http://www.navistarsupplier.com/Documents/IntegratedSupplierQuality/Navi
star%20Integrated%20Supplier%20Quality%20Requirements.pdf (stating that all
current and potential suppliers are expected to comply with the provided Quality
Manual); CATERPILLAR, SUPPLIER CODE OF CONDUCT 1 (2015), http://s7d2.
scene7.com/is/content/Caterpillar/C10756688 (“We expect suppliers to comply with the
sound business practices we embrace . . . .”); Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts,
supra note 11, at 572.
151. But see Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 563
(suggesting that the “network governance” is an alternative to the top-down hierarchy
and achieves “many of the governance benefits of intra-firm hierarchy”).
152. JOHN DEERE, TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND/OR
SERVICES 2 (2019), https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/wcm/connect/jdsn/aa788ea4-de87-4e9a803e-08baee3ca5b9/purchasing_terms_and_conditions_us_eng.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES&CVID=mOVImsB.
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the buyer guard against shading by suppliers.153 They also give suppliers a
low-cost way of bonding (furnishing a credible commitment of quality).
Where there is a dispute about quality, the parties can often work out the
issue informally, especially if the buyer has established quality metrics in its
quality manual. In addition, LTAs may include managerial provisions that
define dispute resolution procedures, which can be cost-saving for both
parties.154 The desire for continued and future business will constrain all
parties, especially when the parties are connected to a network.155 Shirking
could result in negative reputational effects that would hinder the ability of
the buyer and supplier to obtain future contracts.
C. LTAs as a Cost Minimization Strategy
Other goals may be harder to achieve in a unilateral hierarchical fashion,
and thus require the contractual consent of the other party in an LTA. This
would be particularly true in a long-term supply arrangement where, for
example, the buyer wants the supplier to agree to reduce its prices five
percent every year or agree to competition-out clauses.156 The standard
purchase order or terms and conditions on the online portal govern all supply
transactions. Annual cost reductions would only be needed for ongoing
transactions where the buyer is subject to competitive price pressures that
necessitate a guaranteed price reduction from its suppliers.157 The buyer
weighs the risk of entering into a long-term contract to buy with a guarantee
of a fixed price, against the risk that the future supplier prices will be too
high if there are competitive pressures on the buyer to reduce its prices.
A buyer may also enter into an LTA because without such an agreement,
a large buyer such as an OEM would be reluctant to finance the huge
investment of producing a new model car without commitments from
suppliers.158 Corporate management would be reluctant to assume such risks
without assurances of price stability and commitments to furnish supplies.
The LTA thus functions to protect the sunk cost investments made by the
buyer. For example, one interviewee for a large OEM indicated that they
153. See Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, 99 MARQ. L.
REV. 1, 8 (defining shading as “behavior that more accurately describes the vexing
problems courts face in rooting out strategic behavior in contract litigation”).
154. See Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5–6) (describing
beneficial types of managerial provisions that are “conducive to . . . suppliers
continuously improving their ability to deliver high quality products while reducing
costs”).
155. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 599.
156. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 86.
157. Id.
158. Interview with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (Jan. 25, 2019) (confidential source
on file with author).

374

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9:3

would not proceed without an LTA.159
The LTA may also be important for buyers because it can “signal
continuity intentions.”160 In certain collaborative LTAs, the structuring of
investments constitutes examples and cements relationships of
“reciprocity.”161 That may affect the price because price and governance are
linked.162 The buyer would have to pay a higher price if there were no
implicit continuity protection, and the buyer might have a difficult time
getting the supplier to invest sunk costs, such as the construction of a plant.163
The supplier makes the same calculus, weighing whether the additional
costs of entering an LTA are justified and considering how its overall costs
and risks can be minimized. The survey results suggest that the subset of
suppliers making primarily customizable goods or involving large sunk costs
enter into LTAs more frequently than the subset making primarily fungible
goods or involving only minimal sunk costs.164 The supplier has to consider
whether the extra drafting and negotiating costs and other risks of an LTA,
such as the onerous provisions of annual price reductions and other probuyer terms,165 are outweighed by the greater security or commitment of a
continuing purchase obligation — even if that purchase commitment is
qualified or conditional or even terminable — that can be used to defray a
large capital investment. That greater security can be achieved either by
entering into an LTA, which deters early termination by raising switching
costs or providing other implicit protections,166 or by negotiating specific
contractual protections.167
The expectation of implicit contractual
protections from a buyer168 may affect the supplier’s calculus of whether the
LTA is cost minimizing and value maximizing. The entry into the LTA
together with the provision of a unique part that is integrated into the OEM’s
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

chart.

Id.
See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 76, at 34.
See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 594.
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 76, at 33–34.
Interview with Susan Helper, supra note 96.
See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra Q6 and Q4; supra note 75 and accompanying

165. For example, many large buyers reserve the right to terminate for convenience.
See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 12, at 958; FORD MOTOR CO., GLOBAL TERMS AND
CONDITIONS FOR NON-PRODUCTION GOODS AND SERVICES, supra note 120, ¶ 27.01
(“Buyer may terminate Purchase Order, in whole or in part, at any time and for any or
no reason upon written notice to the Supplier.”); APPLE, PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra
note 120, ¶ 14 (allowing Apple to terminate for any reason with ten days of written
notice).
166. See Interview with Susan Helper, supra note 96.
167. These might include protection for capital equipment costs or coverage for
expenditures incurred up until the date of termination.
168. See infra Section IX.E.

2020

WHY CHOOSE LTAS?

375

production, gives “suppliers . . . some power in the course of carrying out a
long-term contract”169 and explains the willingness to enter into LTAs. As
suppliers make large investments to meet the demands of the LTA, the buyer
becomes locked into the supplier since other suppliers could not make the
investments required in order to meet the buyer’s needs.170
The importance of sunk costs demonstrated in the survey data helps to
situate the scholarship on LTAs in a different framework — one that
emphasizes asset specificity rather than uncertainty and innovation. The
sunk costs that one or both parties must invest pose risks of opportunism.
The bilateral LTA is one means of governance that acts as a contractual
safeguard. Innovation scholars have deftly explored the ways that
information transfer mechanisms in an LTA can deter opportunism.171 Our
survey explains why these LTA provisions are important to suppliers with
large sunk costs and why these safeguards are important and cost effective.
Since there is always a “braiding” of formal mechanisms (even with
minimal contract documents such as purchase orders) and informal
adjustment that leads to a buildup of trust and deters opportunism by raising
switching costs as parties get to know each other, the question is why enter
into an LTA when there are large sunk costs? The answer may be that there
are implicit or explicit protections for the continuity of the relationship
needed when sunk costs exist with an LTA that cannot be achieved by
purchase orders, thereby providing a benefit to suppliers that justifies the
higher costs. These protections include not only switching costs but other
implicit protections against early termination or explicit protection for sunk
costs if there is early termination.
This Article offers an explanation for why the costs of LTAs are justified,
through an explanation tied to sunk costs, and a comparative cost analysis.172
Even where there is great uncertainty about the opportunism of the
counterparty or the quality of the products, if the parties did not have to invest
large asset-specific costs, the need for a contractual mechanism might not be
cost-justified since the parties could simply exit. As Williamson explains,
“an increase in parametric uncertainty is a matter of little consequence for
transactions that are nonspecific.”173
D. Information Sharing as a Cost Minimization Strategy
Recent scholarship has identified the information-sharing protocols as a
169. Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 12, at 973.
170. See id. at 974.
171. See Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 5, at 85; see also Helper et al., supra

note 5, at 444.
172. These take the form of capital equipment costs.
173. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 14, at 59.
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key feature of the modern LTA (or MSA) for both innovative manufacturing
and biopharmaceutical industries.174 One question is how and why the
information-sharing protocols would be a cost minimizing strategy.
Structured information sharing allows parties to enter into an agreement
when uncertainty about the innovation process and final product makes it
impossible to enter into a completely contingent contract. It gives the parties
a cost-effective way to build up trust. By each party extending oneself to
one’s partner, a kind of overture and response, trust grows.175 Such
provisions make parties contractually committed to “invest in producing
information,” even if they cannot agree on the ultimate product.176 The
exchange of this “highly revealing information” in the LTAs provides a basis
for iterative investments by both parties that constrains opportunism.
Information sharing may also occur if requested by a party to the agreement
since without it, the unanimity needed to go forward to the next stage of the
innovative process may not be forthcoming.
This incremental exchange of information has several important benefits.
It decreases uncertainty about the counterparty’s competence and increases
trust in the counterparty’s capacity. The iterative exchange of information
reduces uncertainty and therefore risk about the benefits of continuing a joint
project. These observations and the knowledge of the counterparty raise
switching costs for both parties. In addition, there would be negative
reputational effects for leaving the relationship because it would be difficult
to explain to a new party why the agreement failed.177
This research team has two questions that arise from this iterative sharing
of information through an LTA: (1) in a manufacturing setting, how can
information sharing occur outside of an LTA? and (2) if parties share
information without an LTA in ways that will be described below, then when
would the additional costs and burdens of an LTA be justified? Answering
that second question may offer additional insights into how parties structure
their transactions to minimize risk, control opportunism, and provide for
security for investment. The “braiding” that has been rationalized as a way
for buyers to learn more about suppliers, to provide new bases on which to
informally sanction suppliers, and for providing agreement on what
constitutes a breach may have another important function for the supplier.
174. See James A. Breen, Jr., Message from the Chair: ISPE & Information Sharing,
PHARM. ENG’G (Apr. 2019), https://ispe.org/pharmaceutical-engineering/march-april2019/message-from-chair-information-sharing.
175. Of course, such iterative exchange of information can occur outside an LTA.
176. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 476.
177. Id. at 435 (defining switching costs as “the costs one party to a contract must
incur in order to replace the other party to the contract”); see id. at 482 (discussing how
switching costs present a significant barrier where “learning about the quality of potential
substitute suppliers and their products is time consuming and expensive”).
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The investment in information raises “switching” costs,178 thereby providing
security for suppliers investing sunk costs. That protection may be further
supported by implicit contracts to protect suppliers by providing them major
new business when circumstances cause an early termination after a supplier
has invested.
One goal of the survey was to ascertain whether information sharing took
place in the absence of an LTA. Our survey revealed that over half of all
manufacturers indicated they would still share information without an LTA,
and this was true of nearly three-quarters of those manufacturers who
frequently used LTAs. This raises a further question: why would parties
undertake the additional costs of an LTA if much of the required information
could be obtained without one? The surveys prompted further research
outside the survey context into how various types of information may be
obtained both through an LTA and through other means.
In the joint innovation context, where one party is investing knowledge
and another party is investing dollars, each party wants to know that the other
is fully committed to the endeavor. Without that assurance, there would be
little reason to keep investing toward a joint innovation. The failure to
comply with informational exchange would rarely be legally sanctioned
except in blatant cheating or expropriation of another’s property.179 The
iterative exchange builds up trust, creating it when it was not preexisting.180
In the manufacturing context involving large buyers, it appears that there
are a lot of mechanisms for securing information for a buyer from suppliers
that do not depend on the existence of an LTA. Buyers can secure a large
amount of information without ever entering into an LTA. Many of these
mechanisms are designed to reduce uncertainty about the supplier.
One means of reducing that uncertainty is to require suppliers to
prequalify. That can be done outside of an LTA. Also, instead of using an
LTA, the parties can utilize a supplier quality handbook or manual to share
large amounts of information at a reduced cost. There are a number of
options the parties can use to share and assent to the quality manual
processes, including customer specific processes and general arrangements
that apply to all suppliers. One option is requiring all potential suppliers to
acknowledge and certify that they are agreeing to the buyer’s requirements,
such as the quality manual, code of conduct, and terms and conditions, as a
precondition for conducting business with the buyer.181 In addition to
178. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 8, at 1383 n.10.
179. See Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1659–60 (observing that transparency can help

deter cheating where parties are collaborating on new products); see also WILLIAMSON,
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS supra note 76, at 57.
180. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 8, at 1377.
181. See KOHLER CO., GLOBAL SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL, supra note 149, at 7
(“Prior to being awarded business from Kohler all new suppliers must read the Kohler
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utilizing a precertification process, the buyer may simply communicate that
the quality documents are a requirement of potential and continuing business
with the buyer and apply to all suppliers.182
Quality handbooks or manuals may contain provisions requiring suppliers
to gain and maintain ISO Certification, establish minimum quality
requirements, and require compliance with all relevant laws, orders, acts, and
regulations.183 Additionally, the quality handbooks and manuals can require
buyers agree to on-site assessments and audits, and supplier quality
assessment or certification.184 While the quality manual places a number of
requirements on the supplier, it also provides support and guidance for each
supplier.185
In addition to the quality handbooks, buyers may unilaterally impose
further conditions on suppliers such as requiring suppliers to complete buyerdeveloped online webinars,186 courses, or “Supplier Development
Colleges.”187 The buyer may also develop online resources and courses to
Global Supplier Quality Manual and confirm agreement they will comply with its content
and requirements.”); Prospective Suppliers, KOHLER, www.kohler.com/corporate/
supplier/prospective-suppliers.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2020) (stating that those
interested in becoming a Kohler supplier must register).
182. Criteria For Being a John Deere Supplier, JOHN DEERE, https://jdsn.
deere.com/wps/portal/jdsn/Home/Welcome/!ut/p/z1/rZJfT8IwFMU_iw97LC3sD9O3i
YpBmQ8mwPqydFu3FUdb2o6Jn96CRmMiEBL21Nt7d37npgdiuICYkw2riGGCk8b
WCQ7S6fjufux6_Ti8nfgoeuhP4scXfxaM-nAGMcQ5N9LUMFkWmqcdzTQz1EG7
ykG6lbJhVKUF21BlO1sHSWEoN4w06U83V_YfxchOTuasgEnf9QbD6xB5WR6WA
9cPPVRmZVD4g6AMfZLD-d4bOvBFCOLj1uc71rER9D1wBJFYD8NDCtMnD76
esdAJMf-SYsMLio3OW3Ny6mFs6NhyvcaRTZbghr4buLhEtCy4akT2FeuIZ25YQaxo
SRVVvVbZ69oYqW8c5KCu63oFtZ1eLlYOohYnWgVsIQm3HJKJ1oClqDnYjzmoEI
xXIGs141Rr0DFTg1b_urTH_7i10Ha9PzgoV6vQ3YK3Mo4ByULk-nLz8VxOjZ9cf
QLW9jy3/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2020) (indicating that
compliance with the JD Supplier Quality Manual is a precondition for all John Deere
suppliers, which is communicated to all potential suppliers as a required criterion on John
Deere’s prospective supplier’s website).
183. JOHN DEERE, SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL — PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, supra
note 149, at 2, 6; KOHLER CO., GLOBAL SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL, supra note 149, at
6–7; NAVISTAR, INTEGRATED SUPPLIER QUALITY REQUIREMENTS, supra note 150, at 7;
NCR CORP., SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL, supra note 150, at 4, 6.
184. See NCR CORP., SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL, supra note 150, at 4–5, 13–14
(describing quality control requirements).
185. JOHN DEERE, SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL — PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, supra
note 149, at 2; NAVISTAR, INTEGRATED SUPPLIER QUALITY REQUIREMENTS, supra note
150, at 2 (providing all suppliers with online modules, expected to be completed and
understood by suppliers, which detail the requirements of suppliers); NCR CORP.,
SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL, supra note 150, at 4.
186. Supplier Connect, Supplier Development College, CATERPILLAR, https://
supplierconnect.cat.com/wps/portal/catconnect/SDC (last visited Nov. 28, 2020)
(encouraging suppliers to learn from the Supplier Development program); see also
Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 579.
187. CATERPILLAR, supra note 186.
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support the supplier but not specifically require completion as a requirement
of conducting business.188 Further, the buyer may also require that the
supplier participate in supplier performance management reviews,
continuous improvement processes, and participation in supplier excellence
programs.189
The buyer’s purchase order and/or terms and conditions can thus provide
protection for the buyer and result in the transfer of large amounts of
information to the buyer without an LTA. Buyers may also include in their
purchase order or terms and conditions provisions that cover special tooling
costs, buyer supplied equipment, inspections, and indemnification.190 The
buyer’s standard purchase order may contain additional provisions
governing disputes and governing law, product liability and insurance, and
termination for cause or convenience.191 In case either party terminates, the
purchase order can contain clauses covering the termination process
including inventory indemnification, special tooling, or capital expenditures.
A manufacturing company’s purchase order may cover excess and defective
goods, acceptance, modification, and payment.192 Thus, rather than enter
into an LTA that requires compliance with the buyer’s quality manual or
handbook, the buyer’s purchase order or terms and conditions193 can contain
such provisions requiring compliance with both the supplier’s code of
conduct and quality manuals or handbooks.
The mere availability of information about a supplier’s qualifications may
not build trust in the same way that happens when procedures are
implemented that cause the supplier and buyer to be linked, such as when the
buyer sends an engineer to the supplier’s plant. That linkage helps to provide
188. JOHN DEERE, SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL — PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, supra
note 149, at 7 (stating that John Deere does not require participation or completion but
has created a number of online resources, including classes, manuals, and presentations,
to assist suppliers).
189. Id. at 39 (requiring suppliers to participate in the Achieving Excellence
program); JD Supply Network, JD Crop, JOHN DEERE, https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/
portal/jdsn/Home/Welcome/!ut/p/z0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zifd1dXN2
NTQz9LJy8TA0c3Qy9_Dz8TcPMnA31vfSj8CsAmpCZVVgY5agflZyfV5JaUaIfkZV
SnBdfnppUnFmSqmoA4qkaJBYU5GQmg-0tBonFJxflF-gXZEdFAgDM2k5_/
(last
visited Nov. 28, 2020) (requiring suppliers to participate in the JD Crop program);
CATERPILLAR, supra note 186 (offering an excellence program with much less
information available on it than John Deere’s).
190. JOHN DEERE, TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND/OR
SERVICES, supra note 152, at 2 (listing a provision stating that buyers are not responsible
for any excess goods, an indemnification clause, and a requirement that the seller bear
the cost of special tooling).
191. Id.
192. Id.; NCR CORP., SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL, supra note 150, at 9, 18.
193. See JOHN DEERE, TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND/OR
SERVICES, supra note 152, at 1.
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protection through increased switching costs that deter either party from
switching. The LTA, or an informal arrangement, may also set up specific
procedures that require benchmarking error and detection that help a
buyer.194 An LTA may also provide implicit security that if the buyer has to
terminate early, it will find a way to compensate the investing supplier.
When that implicit assurance is degraded because of perceptions of
opportunistic proclivities, the supplier may hedge or refuse to sign an LTA.
Even though the survey did not collect empirical data on reasons why
buyers enter LTAs, the increased information from LTA’s may give buyers
the means to identify new forms of misbehavior195 and to provide the
architecture for demonstrating “how . . . to do business”196 and to furnish
“contract administration mechanisms” which facilitate governance between
firms much as the hierarchy functioned in the firm.197 This increased
information has a similar advantage of avoiding the need for legal
enforcement since the mechanisms do not relate to breach, but to “create a
framework for growing relational social capital . . . .”198 Since there are
other ways to grow social relational capital between firms (incrementally,
over time) that do not depend on an LTA, the question is why and when
buyers would enter such agreements and under what circumstances and for
what reasons. The larger and more complex the firm, the greater the internal
coordination costs.199 Management techniques like lean manufacturing or
key performance indicators can help reduce waste and costs in large and
complex firms.200 Since they are engaging in cost reduction strategies
internally, large buyers may have greater incentive to require suppliers to
adhere to the same management techniques.201 Presumably buyers such as
OEMs make the same calculus as suppliers do, choosing to enter into an LTA
when that particular arrangement minimizes their costs while controlling
contractual hazards and thereby maximizing value.
Although some types of information about suppliers might be obtained in
194. Helper et. al., supra note 5, at 451 (noting procedures implemented “without
reliance on vertical integration or elaborate contracts”).
195. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 604 (discussing
the “broaden[ing] [of] the type of misbehavior than can be policed”).
196. Id. at 562.
197. Id. at 563.
198. Id.
199. See generally Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4 (manuscript at 32–37)
(discussing the incentives underlying “managerial contracting”).
200. Id. at 6, 10–14 (defining “lean manufacturing” and discussing “key performance
indicators” as a means of measuring the “incorporat[ion]” of management techniques).
201. Id. at 27 (“Although individual . . . managerial provisions . . . have the potential
to add value to contracting relationships, taken together these provisions may create
governance benefits that go beyond the incentive effects associated with individual
provisions.”).
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hierarchical means imposed outside an LTA, such as posting the quality
manual on the web and mandating adherence to it or mandating compliance
with ISO Certification or other certification standards, or by posting a portal
for suppliers to learn about the quality requirements,202 there are other
benefits which cannot be obtained without an LTA, including a right to
terminate suppliers. The investment in establishing elaborate private
governance mechanisms in a setting where buyers have large fixed costs may
be justified by the business planning benefits and control over the suppliers’
production processes and resulting trust and increased bond that facilitates
“increasingly complex and innovative value-creating undertakings.”203
Where the investments by the buyer were not significant, the need to devise
such mechanisms through agreements with suppliers would not exist, at least
raising the possibility that sunk costs may explain why buyers are investing
in elaborate LTAs. The LTA may ensure a commitment to price reductions
from suppliers.
The LTA may offer a roadmap for consultation during the course of a
complex process. In each case the buyer would weigh what benefits an LTA
can offer and whether those benefits can be achieved without an LTA. Most
importantly, LTAs offer buyers the needed security of a guaranteed price and
a commitment to supply.204 Without this security large and complex
organizations such as OEMs could not plan or operate. The sunk costs of
planning a car, for example, means that the buyer cannot simply exit and
redeploy its assets. It will not be able to recoup its investment unless it
produces the cars profitably, which cannot occur unless the supplier commits
to supply the parts for the life of the production of the car at a fixed price.
Those goals cannot be achieved without an LTA. A further survey could
confirm whether the presence of the buyer’s large sunk costs help explain
why the buyers enter into an LTA by assuring the buyer a continuing
commitment but often not obligating the buyer to buy at all. It gives the
buyer an option in effect.
E. Self-Help Remedies
For the buyer, the additional costs of an LTA can be spread out over a
myriad of transactions with suppliers. Also, many provisions in the LTA
help to minimize costs for the buyer. Many LTA provisions give the buyer
the ability to engage in self-help remedies that eliminate the need to resort to
a legal solution for goods that do not comply with the buyer’s quality
202. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 578.
203. Id. at 589.
204. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 84–86 (noting that although the buyer may gain

security through guaranteed price reductions and a supply commitment, perhaps at a
guaranteed price, the supplier often does not gain parallel security).
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specifications.205 Instead of employing the buyer remedies in the Uniform
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), the contract provides that the supplier can
remove the unwanted part from the contract, relieving the buyer from any
further obligation to buy.206 Other provisions give the buyer the ability to
get reimbursed for the correction of parts that do not conform, again without
having to seek any remedy through the courts. Often, the buyer in an LTA
is given the right to refuse goods that do not meet the buyer’s standards. The
ability to operate outside of the legal system minimizes costs to the buyer
and explains how the LTA can facilitate self-help remedies and reduce buyer
costs.
While there are many provisions that the buyer can impose on the supplier
unilaterally and informally, other provisions, such as cost reduction
provisions, may require the consent of the supplier.207 Of course, self-help
remedies may be possible if worked out individually between a supplier and
a buyer when goods fail to conform. The LTA’s higher cost may be offset
by a minimization of transaction costs. Instead of having to agree
(extracontractually) to self-help remedies where the supplier agrees to
discount the invoice for goods the buyer complains about, the buyer is given
wide discretion to be relieved of any obligation to buy goods that do not meet
the buyer’s metrics or standards.208 That mechanism relieves the buyer of
having to negotiate each accommodation seriatim.
The self-help provisions of the LTA may also be cost minimizing for the
supplier because the supplier’s willingness to sign an LTA with self-help
provisions acts as a low-cost signal to the buyer — a kind of credible
commitment — that the supplier will not furnish substandard goods or will
readily comply with the self-help provisions of the contract. The supplier
who signs such agreements may be eligible for more favorable prices than if
the supplier insisted on compliance with the full regimen of the U.C.C.
F. Sunk Costs and Cost Reduction Strategies
Another function of the LTA is related to the sunk costs involved in
205. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 11, at 576–78, 589
(explaining that information exchanges encourage cooperation between parties by
helping avoid misunderstandings about what performance is expected).
206. See Matthew C. Brown et al., Termination for Convenience Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, ABA COM. L. NEWSL. (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.wiggin.com/
publication/termination-for-convenience-under-the-uniform-commercial-code/
(explaining that termination for convenience clauses are “becoming increasingly popular
in supply agreements”).
207. See supra note 80 and accompanying text on cost reductions in LTAs.
208. See STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AGREEMENT CORPORATE PROCUREMENT BETWEEN
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION AND WHITESELL CORPORATION § 6.3 (2002) (on file with
author).
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collaborative agreements. The buyer in these supply contracts may require
the supplier to undertake expensive procedures such as root-cause
analysis,209 or other large investments such as implementing a lean
production methodology at the plant,210 or building an entire plant to
manufacture a single component, such as a car door. The entry into an LTA
may help to induce the supplier to provide the foundation that will cement
the relationship and offer the supplier implicit protections even though they
are not formally in the contract.211 That insight led one interviewee to
respond that a large automotive supplier would not have undertaken the
investment toward lean production without the protection of an implicit
contract and security if they made the investment. That security could come
in continuing purchase obligations either in the contract at issue or through
help from the supplier in securing a different contract.212 Other provisions
in an LTA impose on the supplier the need to engage in a cost reduction
program that will redound to the benefit of the buyer. Cost reduction
programs (often called the annual five percent letter) could not be imposed
unilaterally on a supplier without the supplier’s express agreement.
In other instances, the LTA functions as a planning device. Parties refer
to it to determine which party should be investing how much and issuing
what reports. That planning function must occur in the context of an
individually negotiated LTA so the standard terms and conditions or quality
manual available on the web will not provide the needed blueprint for
collaboration, thereby justifying costs of the individual agreement.
One remaining question is how the LTA, with its higher drafting and
lawyering costs, could be a cost minimizing device for suppliers. Our survey
revealed that manufacturers that used LTAs in most of their transactions
tended to produce customizable goods and spend a significant amount on
capital expenditures. This is an important finding, because if a product is
customized for a particular buyer, and the supplier invested sunk costs
toward customization, that investment makes an easy exit from the
relationship or resale to others difficult and costly. Where such
vulnerabilities exist, the need for protection may justify the costs of LTAs.
The costs are especially justified if the supplier can negotiate contractual
protection for sunk costs or a continuing commitment to purchase which can
help defray the sunk cost investment.213 LTAs may protect against sunk
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See Sabel, Real-Time Revolution, supra note 2, at 122.
Id. at 118.
Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 40, at 988.
See Interview with Susan Helper, supra note 96.
See Whitesell Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 1:05–CV–679, 2010 WL 1875513,
at *4 (W.D. Mich. May 10, 2010) (stating that the defendant had a continuing obligation
to “purchase all of Whitesell’s ‘pre-approved’ inventory”).
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costs in a variety of ways, such as by providing for the protection of large
capital equipment and providing that if the relationship terminates, the
capital equipment belongs to the supplier.
There are two primary differences that explain why and when suppliers
use LTAs. They are likely to occur when the goods are: (1) customizable
non-fungible; and (2) there are large sunk capital equipment costs involved
in the manufacture. These two factors make it difficult for the supplier to
exit and resell the goods. The greater sunk costs and accompanying
vulnerabilities may justify the greater costs of an LTA, at least if the LTA
offers greater protection to the party asymmetrically investing sunk costs,
either through contractual protection for capital equipment or by implicit
contracting or by switching costs, all of which function to protect suppliers.
Another way to protect sunk cost investments that can occur in an LTA is
through the parties investing mutual sunk costs resulting in a mutual
dependency. Mutual investment could occur when the buyer invests in
training suppliers and suppliers invest in training to become excellent
suppliers.214 This can occur in an LTA in which one party invests sunk costs
in research and the other invests research dollars. When those sunk costs are
not present, as when the supplier sells catalog items,215 the supplier may
operate using less costly arrangements, such as a purchase order or terms and
conditions. The supplier has less need for contractual protections because
the supplier can simply exit and resell.
This outcome linking the greater use by suppliers of LTAs to greater sunk
costs is consistent with the parties achieving their goals while minimizing
transaction costs. The supplier who invests large sunk costs (either capital
equipment or investments in procedures such as lean production or in
building an entire new plant) faces the prospect of opportunistic behavior by
a buyer who terminates early. The supplier may enter into an LTA which
may offer some security to purchase goods over a period of time. The
protection for the supplier that comes from entering into an LTA can come
through specific contractual protections for sunk costs or capital equipment
in the LTA. It can also come through informal protections or implicit
contracts that come once the supplier has invested sunk costs. Simply
entering into an LTA may help to cement the relationship.216 The
demonstration of competence may also deter the buyer’s exit from the
214. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 476 (stating that the
“mutual investment” serves as a safeguard against “opportunism”).
215. Kostritsky, supra note 15, at 1673 (stating how LTAs can control terms for
suppliers across the board); see Purchase Orders Helping to Control Costs,
ZENVENTORY, https://www.zenventory.com/purchase-orders-help-control-costs/ (last
visited Nov. 28, 2020).
216. Interview with [Redacted], in [Redacted]. (June 17, 2017) (confidential source
on file with author).
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relationship as finding other competent suppliers will take time.217
Thus, where the sunk costs are large and the goods are not fungible, the
ability to recoup or to protect such investment will depend on a variety of
strategies, some informal and some contractual. If the sunk costs are low,
the LTA may not be needed. Although an LTA may offer protection for the
supplier, the buyer may find enough other benefits in the LTA to offer the
cost of an LTA and make it cost minimizing for the buyer. Transaction cost
minimization may help to explain other differences, as discussed below.
G. Informal and Implicit Contracts
Even without a contractual provision protecting its sunk costs, a supplier
may be relying on the iterative exchange of information and personnel to
build up a relationship of trust. Such a relationship will serve to curb
opportunistic behavior by the buyer. The information exchange leads to an
incremental reduction of uncertainty about buyer opportunism. Moreover,
as both parties learn more and become more comfortable as partners,
switching out becomes less feasible. Entering into an LTA and engaging in
the exchange of information resulting in “braiding” becomes a private
strategy to bind the parties together and also results in protecting the
suppliers’ sunk costs. Implicit contracts then arise to protect the supplier.
For example, when the Lear Company developed seats for a Honda minivan
and that minivan was never made, each party accommodated the other. Lear
agreed that the downturn in demand was an outside event that excused Honda
from buying the seats. Honda, despite there being no enforceable obligation,
helped Lear enter the side mirror and other markets. These implicit contracts
that arise from long-term partnerships help to explain why suppliers with
large sunk costs are willing to enter into LTAs; the implicit contract
protections serve as a private strategy of protection. The supplier may
believe and rest on an implicit contract that the buyer will protect suppliers
who invest large sunk costs, even without being obligated to do so. Another
example of this occurred with Honda Motor Company and Donnelly.218
Cost minimization as a tool for understanding supply chain arrangements
can be understood in this way. Where there are large sunk costs being
demanded of suppliers, the LTA may offer a cost-effective safeguard against
opportunism. Some of these protections are implicit contracts to protect
suppliers who invest for buyers. Other safeguards arise from the switching
217. It is not actually necessary to enter an LTA to demonstrate competence since a
supplier investing and producing could demonstrate that competence over time, leading
to a lock-in effect. The question is what protection the LTA offers suppliers in terms of
a security of commitment (legal or implicit) or in terms of protection for sunk costs as,
for example, a provision that obligates the buyer to pay for parts and sunk costs when
the buyer decides to terminate.
218. Interview with Susan Helper, supra note 96.
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costs from iterative investments. Where sunk costs are low, the supplier can
easily exit to protect itself and the costs of an LTA may not be justified.
The cost minimization explanation linking LTAs to large sunk costs by
suppliers may also explain another governance mechanism in the LTAs: the
use of a veto. Professor Jennejohn explains the veto right contained in many
LTAs involving intellectual property as a way of providing a “right to
exclude.”219 The party wants a veto power to exclude the counterparty from
appropriating his foreground intellectual property. The veto is a governance
mechanism. The question is why it would be a cost minimizing way to deal
with the threat of appropriation of intellectual property. The answer is that
without the veto, there is the threat that the property may be shared and the
boundaries improperly delineated. Once that occurs, it may be difficult to
unwind and separate out the intellectual property. The type of governance
mechanisms featured in the work of the innovation scholars that bind parties
together and prevent an early exit or opportunism in the form of shading of
quality may not work with protecting “foreground IP.”220 Once the property
is shared, “U.S. patent law allows a joint owner to license and otherwise
exploit a jointly owned asset,” and the most cost-effective mechanism is to
prevent the appropriation from occurring in the first place.221 Informal
sanctioning would not work because there would be nothing to sanction once
the intellectual property had been appropriated. Thus, the parties may agree
to an LTA that contains a veto right since the problem of protecting
foreground intellectual property cannot be solved through informal
sanctioning. In this situation, an LTA with a veto provision may be needed.
The LTA veto provision responds to a risk that cannot be controlled with the
informal sanctioning. Thus, the extra conduct provision is cost minimizing.
Another example of an LTA as a cost minimization strategy can be found
with Apple and SCI. On their face, the extensive collaboration provisions
reflected in the agreement between Apple and SCI may seem burdensome
and costly.222 However, the costs of those undertakings by the supplier in a
collaborative undertaking will be considered, along with the risk of multiple
suppliers, and weighed against the greater switching costs if the supplier can
demonstrate that it is a worthier, more collaborative supplier than other
Apple suppliers. Then, Apple will bear the greater investment in
collaborative efforts going forward because it would be loath to lose the
worthy supplier as a partner. The supplier would consider the benefits of
219. Jennejohn, Private Order, supra note 112, at 324.
220. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 8, at 1410–11 (stating how parties use

different governing mechanisms to lock each other into an agreement); Jennejohn,
Private Order, supra note 112, at 308.
221. Jennejohn, Private Order, supra note 112, at 324.
222. See Apple-SCI Agreement, supra note 99.
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such loyalty and security along with the other benefits of the contract,
including the initial three-year purchase commitment.
If the supplier encounters a circumstance that changes its calculus of
whether the implicit contract will still offer protection without an explicit
provision to do so, the supplier may no longer view the LTA as a cost
minimizing strategy. Parties and courts constantly trade off these costs.
Parties will no longer participate in the informal governance mechanism if
the costs are not offset by greater benefits in achieving parties’ goals while
minimizing costs. For example, the supplier’s willingness to enter into an
LTA may depend on whether the supplier believes the buyer is trustworthy.
When the supplier believes that the buyer is opportunistic and will renege on
any obligations in the LTA, the supplier’s calculus changes because the
buyer’s propensity to act opportunistically will require additional
protections. Once the buyer decides that it can cancel at will, the implicit
protections afforded by iterative investment may no longer be effective.
Doubts about the buyer’s use of supplier information might lead to another
cost minimizing strategy — hedging. In circumstances where the supplier
has doubts about the buyer, the supplier may start to hedge and withhold
some private information. That hedging strategy can be seen as a cost
minimizing strategy by the supplier to control buyer opportunism when the
contract itself does not constrain such behavior. The hedging strategy differs
from opting out of an LTA. Instead of opting out, a supplier holds back
information while technically complying with its obligations under an LTA.
X. CONCLUSION
Manufacturers seem to be making deliberate choices about whether to
operate using an LTA or an alternative arrangement, such as a purchase order
or terms and conditions. These deliberate choices are often tied to whether
a manufacturer is likely to incur significant capital expenditures or the
potential for large sunk costs as the result of the transaction. When a supplier
does not have large sunk costs and is making a fungible good, and can easily
exit the relationship without sacrificing large investments, the cost
minimizing strategy may be to use an alternative to the LTA and rely on
other arrangements.
Although the sample size in this study was small, our results provide
additional insights into manufacturer decision making regarding contractual
arrangements.
Our survey of Ohio manufacturers highlights that
manufacturers have to weigh many considerations before entering into an
LTA. Weighing these considerations leads to a diversity of contractual
arrangements among manufacturers, with only a small minority (seventeen
percent) using LTAs in most of their transactions.
Our empirical findings are consistent with a model of bargaining under
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conditions that include bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism. In
instances where a supplier is requested to customize a product for a buyer,
and such customization results in significant sunk costs for the manufacturer,
then the manufacturer rationally may seek to protect itself through an LTA.
Without the protection of an LTA, the buyer may exit the relationship easily
and the overall transaction becomes costly for the supplier. LTAs can also
provide additional frameworks, such as information-sharing provisions, to
help safeguard the supplier’s relationship with the buyer. These findings
provided from manufacturer surveys serve as a useful complement to current
research reviewing existing LTAs and theoretical models exploring the
potential use of such agreements.
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SUPPLIERS
SELLING TO CUSTOMERS
Requesting Participation in Survey
Case Western Reserve University
Dear Manufacturer,
I am a professor at Case Western Reserve University Law School. My
special areas of expertise are Contracts and Law and Economics. I am
studying the legal relationships between manufacturing companies and their
customers in the supply chain. In order to complete this study, we are
conducting a survey of various suppliers who manufacture goods or parts for
their customers. Your response to this survey would be invaluable to the
study. All responses will remain anonymous. You have been selected
because you are a manufacturer in Ohio, Wisconsin, or Michigan who
produces products or parts used by customer/buyers who may use your input
in a product they manufacture and sell. You are either in Sales and
Marketing or the General Counsel’s office. If you receive this survey and
another person at your company is better equipped to answer the survey,
please redirect it to them. The purpose of this survey is to determine when
manufacturing companies and their customers rely on various long-term or
master supply agreements (LTAs; MSAs) to guide their interactions.
Specifically, we are hoping to learn when companies use these agreements,
what specific purposes the agreements serve, when companies use
alternatives to an LTA or MSA (such as a purchase order, quote and
acknowledgement or another arrangement such as acting as a contract
manufacturer or entering a licensing agreement on a jointly developed
product without using an LTA or MSA). Feel free to include any additional
comments you deem necessary or relevant to our study.

BACKGROUND QUESTIONS
Q1 What are your company’s main products?
____________________________________________________________
Q2 What percentage of your work for customers is a customizable good?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-35% (2)
o 36-66% (3)
o 67-100% (4)
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Q3 What percentage of your work for customers is a commodity or
fungible good?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-35% (2)
o 36-66% (3)
o 67-100% (4)
Q4 For what percentage of sales do you acquire capital equipment or
tooling that will be used for a specific buyer that is significant in cost?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-35% (2)
o 36-66% (3)
o 67-100% (4)

LONG TERM AGREEMENT (“LTA”) / MASTER SUPPLY
AGREEMENT (“MSA”) OR OTHER GOVERNING DOCUMENTS
Q5 If you use LTAs or MSAs, which of the following provisions is the
MOST and LEAST important to you in terms of a possible lawsuit later
on? Please organize the options for 1 MOST important to 6 LEAST
important.
Provision to protect capital equipment costs or tooling costs (1)
Indemnity for intellectual property infringement (2)
Damages cap (3)
Indemnity for damages caused to a third party (4)
Warranty disclaimers (5)
Limitation of remedies provision (6)
Q6 In what percentage of transactions do you sign an LTA or MSA?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-25% (2)
o 26-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
Q7 What percentage of firm revenues do transactions with an LTA or
MSA represent for your firm?
o 0-25% (1)
o 26-50% (2)
o 51-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
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Q8 If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what percentage is the agreement
drafted by you?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-25% (2)
o 26-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
Q9 What are the main reasons you sign LTAs or MSAs?
▢ Security of continuing commitment from the buyer (1)
▢ No choice; dictated by the buyer (2)
▢ Establish an efficient system for information sharing to improve your
product (3)
▢ Demonstrate your commitment to the quality of your product or
process (4)
▢ Other, explain below: (5) __________________________________
Q10 If you sign an LTA or MSA, are you required to share information
with the buyer about engineering, costs and/or quality?
o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o No (3)
Q11 If you do NOT sign an LTA or MSA with the sharing of
information, do you supply that information to your buyer anyway?
Please explain your response.
o Yes, explain: (1) _________________________________________
o No, explain: (2) __________________________________________
Q12 If you do NOT sign LTAs or MSAs, please rank order the reasons
you did not sign an LTA with 1 being the MOST important the 6 being
the LEAST important.
Terms too onerous (1)
Do not want to sign a competition out clause (2)
Do not want to allow buyer a right to terminate for convenience (3)
Price reduction requirements too onerous (4)
Already doing business under other documents such as terms and
conditions or purchase order (5)
Other, explain below: (6) __________________________________
Q13 What type of buyers or industries insist on an LTA or MSA?
____________________________________________________________
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Q14 Do the buyers or industries that insist on LTAs or MSA have any
of the following characteristics in common?
o Buyer is large in size or an Original Equipment Manufacturer (1)
o Buyer is engaged in intensive collaboration with us on innovated
product (2)
o Other, explain below: (3) __________________________________
Q15 Select the answer that best applies. Are the buyers who insist on
using LTAs or MSAs:
o In the top 20% of companies you work with in terms of size and/or
revenue (1)
o In the top 50% of companies you work with in terms of size and/or
revenue (2)
o In the bottom 20% of companies you work with in terms of size and/or
revenue (3)
Q16 In what percentage of your deals do you agree to manufacture a
product without an LTA or MSA in place?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-35% (2)
o 36-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
Q17 If you do agree to manufacture a product without an LTA or MSA,
what document/s would govern this transaction? Pick all that apply.
▢ Intellectual Property and Licensing Agreements (1)
▢ Blueprints only; you act as a contract manufacturer (2)
▢ Terms and Conditions (3)
▢ Purchase order/quote/acknowledgement (4)
▢ Other, explain below: (5) __________________________________
Q18 If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what percentage of agreements does
it contain a minimum quantity, percentage volume, or exact quantity
term?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-35% (2)
o 36-66% (3)
o 67-100% (4)
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Q19 If the LTA or MSA has no quantity clause or no minimum quantity
clause and no percentage volume commitment, would you consider the
agreement at the time that it is signed to be?
o Legally enforceable (1)
o Legally unenforceable (2)
o Not sure (3)
Q20 If the LTA or MSA lacks a quantity term, when do you think the
LTA or MSA would become enforceable?
o When the first purchase order was signed (1)
o When the LTA or MSA is signed (2)
o Another time, explain below: (3) ____________________________
Q21 In what percentage of cases do you agree that the buyer can
terminate for convenience as a clause in the LTA or MSA?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-25% (2)
o 26-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
Q22 Suppose your LTA/MSA had NO termination for convenience
clause. If your buyer indicated it no longer needed your parts and
wanted to terminate 2 years into a 3-year contract, would you allow the
buyer to exit anyway?
o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o In some cases only, explain below: (3) ________________________
Q23 In what percentage of cases do you need to prequalify as a supplier
to sell your products to a buyer even if there is no LTA or MSA?
o 0-25% (1)
o 26-50% (2)
o 51-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
Q24 In what percentage of sales does the Purchase Order or Terms and
Conditions from your buyer or Instructions on the Buyer’s website
require your product to comply with a buyer quality or excellence
manual?
o 0-25% (1)
o 26-50% (2)
o 51-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
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Q25 If you are required to participate in an ongoing quality assessment
program by the buyer, how is it required? Please select any that apply.
▢ LTA or MSA (1)
▢ Terms of a purchase order (2)
▢ Terms and conditions of your customer (3)
▢ Other, explain below: (4) __________________________________

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MANUFACTURER AND BUYER
Q26 Are you required to attend any, or a certain number of, meetings
with the buyer because of an LTA or MSA provision?
o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q27 If not required to attend meetings with the buyer as required under
the LTA or MSA, do you attend meetings anyway?
o Yes (1)
o No (2)

PRODUCT DESIGN
Q28 What percentage of your products are co-designed in collaboration
with the buyer?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-25% (2)
o 26-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
Q29 If there is significant collaboration with a buyer, in what percentage
of cases do you enter an LTA or MSA?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-25% (2)
o 26-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
Q30 If you collaborated in design, how successful would you rate the
collaboration?
o Not at all successful (1)
o Somewhat successful (2)
o Moderately successful (3)
o Very successful (4)
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Q31 In what percentage of cases does the buyer supply you with
blueprints for the end product (or, together, you determine the
blueprints for the end product) and your only job is to execute the
blueprints?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-25% (2)
o 26-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)

COUNSEL AND DISPUTES
Q32 In any arrangement with the buyer under a purchase order, LTA,
or MSA, in what percentage of cases would you resort to suing the
buyer because of a dispute?
o 0-10% (1)
o 11-25% (2)
o 26-75% (3)
o 76-100% (4)
Q40 Is there any additional information that you would like to share
with us at this time?
____________________________________________________________
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AGGREGATED SURVEY RESPONSES
Q1 – What are your company’s main products?

Q2 – What percentage of your work for customers is a customizable
good?
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#
4
3
2
1

Answer
67-100%
36-66%
11-35%
0-10%
Total

397

%
65%
14%
9%
12%
100%

Count
45
10
6
8
69

Q3 – What percentage of your work for customers is a commodity or
fungible good?
0-10%
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36-66%
67-100%
0%
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What percentage of your work for customers is
a commodity or fungible good?
0-10%
11-35%
36-66%
67-100%
Total

90%

100%

Percentage
56%
13%
15%
16%
68

Q4 – For what percentage of sales do you acquire capital equipment or
tooling that will be used for a specific buyer that is significant in cost?
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#
1
2
3
4

Answer
0-10%
11-35%
36-66%
67-100%
Total

%
38%
22%
10%
29%
100%
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Count
26
15
7
20
68

Q5 – If you use LTAs or MSAs, which of the following provisions is the
MOST and LEAST important to you in terms of a possible lawsuit later
on? Please organize the options for 1 MOST important to 6 LEAST
important.
#

Question

1

2

3

4

5

6

Total

17%

4%

6%

11%

32%

47

11%

9%

17%

17%

23%

47

17%

19%

26%

23%

6%

9%

47

15%

13%

21%

28%

17%

6%

47

9%

30%

13%

19%

26%

4%

47

6%

11%

28%

6%

23%

26%

47

Provision to protect
1 capital equipment
30%
costs or tooling costs
Indemnity for
2 intellectual property 23%
infringement
3 Damages cap
Indemnity for
4 damages caused to a
third party
Warranty
5
disclaimers
6

Limitation of
remedies provision
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Q6 – In what percentage of transactions do you sign an LTA or MSA?

0-10%
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26-75%
76-100%
0%
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Total
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21
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63

Q7 – What percentage of firm revenues do transactions with an LTA or
MSA represent for your firm?
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What percentage of firm revenues do
transactions with an LTA or MSA represent
for your firm?
0-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-100%
Total

Vol. 9:3
Percentage
38%
25%
13%
24%
63

Q8 – If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what percentage is the agreement
drafted by you?

0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
0%

#
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4
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If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what
percentage is the agreement drafted by you?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
Total

90%

100%

Percentage
60%
7%
21%
12%
58
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Q9 – What are the main reasons you sign LTAs or MSAs?
Security of
continuing commitment
from the buyer

No choice; dictated
by the buyer
Establish an
efficient system
for information
sharing to improve
your product
Demonstrate your
commitment to the
quality of your
product or process
Other, explain
below:

0%

#
1
2
3
4
5

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

What are the main reasons you sign LTAs or
MSAs? - Selected Choice
Security of continuing commitment from the
buyer
No choice; dictated by the buyer
Establish an efficient system for information
sharing to improve your product
Demonstrate your commitment to the quality of
your product or process
Other, explain below:
Total

90% 100%

Percentage
39%
35%
6%
6%
14%
80

Q10 – If you sign an LTA or MSA, are you required to share
information with the buyer about engineering, costs and/or quality?
No

Yes
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Q11 – If you do NOT sign an LTA or MSA with the sharing of
information, do you supply that information to your buyer anyway?
Please explain your response.

Yes, explain:

No, explain:
0%

#
1
2

10%
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40%
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70%

80%

If you do NOT sign an LTA or MSA with the
sharing of information, do you supply that
information to your buyer anyway? Please
explain your response. - Selected Choice
Yes, explain:
No, explain:
Total

90%

100%

Percentage
56%
44%
64
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Q12 – If you do NOT sign LTAs or MSAs, please rank order the reasons
you did not sign an LTA with 1 being the MOST important the 6 being
the LEAST important.
# Question
Other, explain
6
below:
Already doing
business under other
5 documents such as
terms and conditions
or purchase order
Price reduction
4 requirements too
onerous
Do not want to allow
buyer a right to
3
terminate for
convenience
Do not want to sign
2 a competition out
clause
1 Terms too onerous

1

2

3

4

5

6

8%

3%

2%

0%

3%

85% 65

29% 11% 6%

6%

40% 8%

65

12% 17% 11% 37% 20% 3%

65

5%

8%

38% 31% 18% 0%

65

2%

32% 26% 17% 18% 5%

65

45% 29% 17% 9%

0%

0%

Total

65

Q13 – What type of buyers or industries insist on an LTA or MSA?
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Q14 – Do the buyers or industries that insist on LTAs or MSA have any
of the following characteristics in common?
Buyer is large
in size or an Original
Equipment Manufacturer
Buyer is engaged in
intensive collaboration
with us on
innovated product
Other, explain below:
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Do the buyers or industries that insist on
LTAs or MSA have any of the following
characteristics in common? - Selected Choice
Buyer is large in size or an Original Equipment
Manufacturer
Buyer is engaged in intensive collaboration with
us on innovated product
Other, explain below:
Total

90% 100%

Percentage
78%
5%
17%
64

Q15 – Select the answer that best applies. Are the buyers who insist on
using LTAs or MSAs:
In the top 20% of
companies you work
with in terms of size
and/or revenue
In the top 50% of
companies you work
with in terms of size
and/or revenue
In the bottom 20% of
companies you work
with in terms of size
and/or revenue
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Select the answer that best applies. Are the
buyers who insist on using LTAs or MSAs:
In the top 20% of companies you work with in
terms of size and/or revenue
In the top 50% of companies you work with in
terms of size and/or revenue
In the bottom 20% of companies you work with
in terms of size and/or revenue
Total

Percentage
58%
28%
13%
60

Q16 – In what percentage of your deals do you agree to manufacture a
product without an LTA or MSA in place?
0-10%

11-35%

36-75%

76-100%
0%

#
1
2
3
4
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40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

In what percentage of your deals do you agree
to manufacture a product without an LTA or
MSA in place?
0-10%
11-35%
36-75%
76-100%
Total

90%

100%

Percentage
13%
24%
27%
37%
63
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Q17 – If you do agree to manufacture a product without an LTA or
MSA, what document/s would govern this transaction? Pick all that
apply.
Intellectual Property
and Licensing
Agreements
Blueprints only;
you act as a contract
manufacturer
Terms and Conditions
Purchase order/
quote/acknowledgement
Other, explain below:
0%

#
1
2
3
4
5

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

If you do agree to manufacture a product
without an LTA or MSA, what document/s
would govern this transaction? Pick all that
apply. - Selected Choice
Intellectual Property and Licensing Agreements
Blueprints only; you act as a contract
manufacturer
Terms and Conditions
Purchase order/quote/acknowledgement
Other, explain below:
Total

Percentage
17%
19%
30%
32%
3%
155
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Q18 – If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what percentage of agreements
does it contain a minimum quantity, percentage volume, or exact
quantity term?
0-10%
11-35%
36-66%
67-100%
0%

#
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If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what
percentage of agreements does it contain a
minimum quantity, percentage volume, or
exact quantity term?
0-10%
11-35%
36-66%
67-100%
Total

90%

100%

Percentage
34%
7%
14%
45%
56

Q19 – If the LTA or MSA has no quantity clause or no minimum
quantity clause and no percentage volume commitment, would you
consider the agreement at the time that it is signed to be?
Legally
enforceable
Legally
unenforceable
Not sure
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If the LTA or MSA has no quantity clause or
no minimum quantity clause and no
percentage volume commitment, would you
consider the agreement at the time that it is
signed to be?
Legally enforceable
Legally unenforceable
Not sure
Total

Vol. 9:3

Percentage
36%
20%
45%
56

Q20 – If the LTA or MSA lacks a quantity term, when do you think the
LTA or MSA would become enforceable?
When the first
purchase order was
signed
When the LTA or MSA
is signed
Another time,
explain below:

0%

#
1
2
3
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If the LTA or MSA lacks a quantity term,
when do you think the LTA or MSA would
become enforceable? - Selected Choice
When the first purchase order was signed
When the LTA or MSA is signed
Another time, explain below:
Total

80%

90% 100%

Percentage
29%
44%
27%
62
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Q21 – In what percentage of cases do you agree that the buyer can
terminate for convenience as a clause in the LTA or MSA?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
0%

10%

#
4
3
2
1

20%

30%

40%

50%

Answer
76-100%
26-75%
11-25%
0-10%
Total

60%

70%

%
32%
20%
10%
38%
100%

80%

90%

100%

Count
19
12
6
23
60

Q22 – Suppose your LTA/MSA had NO termination for convenience
clause. If your buyer indicated it no longer needed your parts and
wanted to terminate 2 years into a 3-year contract, would you allow the
buyer to exit anyway?
Yes

No
In some cases only,
explain below:
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Suppose your LTA/MSA had NO termination
for convenience clause. If your buyer
indicated it no longer needed your parts and
wanted to terminate 2 years into a 3-year
contract, would you allow the buyer to exit
anyway? - Selected Choice
Yes
No
In some cases only, explain below:
Total

Vol. 9:3

Percentage

27%
19%
55%
64

Q23 – In what percentage of cases do you need to prequalify as a
supplier to sell your products to a buyer even if there is no LTA or MSA?
0-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-100%
0%

#
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In what percentage of cases do you need to
prequalify as a supplier to sell your products
to a buyer even if there is no LTA or MSA?
0-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-100%
Total

90%

100%

Percentage
28%
13%
16%
44%
64
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Q24 – In what percentage of sales does the Purchase Order or Terms
and Conditions from your buyer or Instructions on the Buyer’s website
require your product to comply with a buyer quality or excellence
manual?
0-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-100%
0%

#
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4
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In what percentage of sales does the Purchase
Order or Terms and Conditions from your
buyer or Instructions on the Buyer’s website
require your product to comply with a buyer
quality or excellence manual?
0-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-100%
Total

90%

100%

Percentage
18%
11%
24%
47%
66

Q25 – If you are required to participate in an ongoing quality assessment
program by the buyer, how is it required? Please select any that apply.
LTA or MSA
Terms of a
purchase order
Terms and
conditions of your
customer
Other,
explain below:
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If you are required to participate in an
ongoing quality assessment program by the
buyer, how is it required? Please select any
that apply. - Selected Choice
LTA or MSA
Terms of a purchase order
Terms and conditions of your customer
Other, explain below:
Total

Vol. 9:3

Percentage
16%
30%
40%
13%
105

Q26 – Are you required to attend any, or a certain number of, meetings
with the buyer because of an LTA or MSA provision?
Yes

No
0%

#
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Are you required to attend any, or a certain
number of, meetings with the buyer because
of an LTA or MSA provision?
Yes
No
Total

90%

100%

Percentage
30%
70%
61

Q27 – If not required to attend meetings with the buyer as required
under the LTA or MSA, do you attend meetings anyway?
Yes

No
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If not required to attend meetings with the
buyer as required under the LTA or MSA, do
you attend meetings anyway?
Yes
No
Total

#
1
2

Percentage
74%
26%
43

Q28 – What percentage of your products are co-designed in
collaboration with the buyer?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
0%
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What percentage of your products are codesigned in collaboration with the buyer?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
Total

#
1
2
3
4

90%

100%

Percentage
52%
18%
18%
11%
65

Q29 – If there is significant collaboration with a buyer, in what
percentage of cases do you enter an LTA or MSA?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
0%
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If there is significant collaboration with a
buyer, in what percentage of cases do you
enter an LTA or MSA?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
Total

Vol. 9:3
Percentage
42%
18%
19%
21%
57

Q30 – If you collaborated in design, how successful would you rate the
collaboration?
Not at all
successful
Somewhat
successful
Moderately
successful
Very
successful
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If you collaborated in design, how successful
would you rate the collaboration?
Not at all successful
Somewhat successful
Moderately successful
Very successful
Total

80%

90%

100%

Percentage
2%
11%
38%
49%
53
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Q31 – In what percentage of cases does the buyer supply you with
blueprints for the end product (or, together, you determine the
blueprints for the end product) and your only job is to execute the
blueprints?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
0%
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In what percentage of cases does the buyer
supply you with blueprints for the end
product (or, together, you determine the
blueprints for the end product) and your
only job is to execute the blueprints?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
Total

#
1
2
3
4

90%

100%

Percentage
34%
11%
18%
37%
65

Q32 – In any arrangement with the buyer under a purchase order,
LTA, or MSA, in what percentage of cases would you resort to suing
the buyer because of a dispute?
0-10%
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26-75%

76-100%
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In any arrangement with the buyer under a
purchase order, LTA, or MSA, in what
percentage of cases would you resort to suing
the buyer because of a dispute?
0-10%
11-25%
26-75%
76-100%
Total

Vol. 9:3
Percentage
92%
5%
3%
0%
64

